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Unlike almost all early Supreme Court Justices, John McLean
came from extraordinarily humble origins. He was born in New Jersey
in 1785.1 His parents, Fergus and Sophia Blackford McLean, were
farmers who moved to Virginia in 1789, Kentucky in 1790, and finally
Ohio in 1796. Like many children of the frontier, the future Justice
2
had no formal education for most of his boyhood.
I

President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, Albany
Law School. I thank my research assistants Lauren L. Hunt and Lauren Prager, my
administrative assistant Fredd Brewer, and the staff of the Albany Law School Library for their
help on this Article. I also thank the members of the faculty seminar at Akron Law School for
their comments and suggestions.
1.
The biographical and factual material relating to Justice McLean's political career
appearing in the introductory part of this Article and in Part I, if not otherwise cited, is taken
from FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN OF THE UNITED
STATES (1937).

2.
By contrast, Chief Justices and Associate Justices John Jay, John Rutledge, John
Marshall, Roger B. Taney, Bushrod Washington, Brockholst Livingston, and John Blair all came
from wealthy, and often politically powerful, families. Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson
graduated from Princeton (then known as the College of New Jersey). William Cushing and
Joseph Story were solidly middle class graduates of Harvard University. Samuel Chase was
educated by his father, an Anglican priest. For basic biographical information on the Justices of
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Finally, at age sixteen, McLean studied classics in a local
school. At nineteen, he was an apprentice in the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas and studied law under Arthur St. Clair, Jr.,
the son of the former territorial governor. McLean then edited a
newspaper in Lebanon, Ohio, practiced law, and worked for the
federal land office. In 1812, Ohio gained five new congressional seats;
the twenty-eight-year-old McLean won one of these seats and served
in Congress until 1816, when, at age thirty-one, he took a seat on the
Ohio Supreme Court. He left the court in 1822 when President James
Monroe made him Commissioner of the General Land Office. In 1823,
Monroe brought him into his cabinet as Postmaster General, and he
held that position until 1829, serving three successive Presidents:
James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson. Shortly
after taking office, President Jackson appointed McLean to the
Supreme Court, where he sat from 1829 to 1861. When he died on
April 3, 1861, the eve of the Civil War, he was the last surviving
member of the administrations of Monroe and Adams, serving as a
living link between the founding and the secession crisis. One minister
eulogized that his death was a portent of the "dark cloud" that had
"been gathering over this nation" and of the "approaching evil" the
3
nation faced.
When McLean went to the bench in 1829, he was considered a
likely presidential candidate for the next election in 1832. 4 Indeed,
from 1832 until 1860 he was "in play" in every presidential campaign
except 1840. In 1832, the new Anti-Masonic Party offered him the
chance to run for President, but he declined. Various groups and
parties put forward McLean's name as a presidential candidate in
1836, 1848, 1852, 1856, and 1860. He was not a candidate in 1840,
however, because a fellow Ohioan, William Henry Harrison, was the
Whig candidate. In 1844, some delegates at the Whig Convention
proposed naming him the vice presidential candidate. In 1856, he
sought the nomination of three different parties, and in 1860 he
received votes at both the Republican Convention and the
Constitutional Union Party Convention.

the Supreme
Court,
see Oyez,
U.S. Supreme Court Media, Browse Justices,
http://www.oyez.org/courts/, and entries on the Justices in AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY,
availableat http://www.anb.org/articlesfhome.html.
3.
WILLIAM B. SPRAGUE, A DISCOURSE DELIVERED SUNDAY MORNING, APRIL 7, 1861, IN THE
SECOND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, ALBANY, IN COMMEMORATION OF THE LATE HON. JOHN MCLEAN,
LL. D., ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1861) (on file

with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
4.

Michael A. Kahn, The Appointment of John McLean to the Supreme Court: Practical

PresidentialPolitics in the Jacksonian Era, 18 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 59, 66-70 (1993).
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His thirty-two years on the Supreme Court make him one of
the twelve longest serving Justices in history. 5 At the time of his
death, he was the third longest serving Justice in the history of the
Court, 6 and he is sixth in length of service among all Justices who
served before the twentieth century. He wrote about 240 majority
7
opinions and about sixty separate concurring and dissenting opinions.
Yet he is about as obscure a Justice as there has ever been. Few
Justices have worked so hard for such a long period of time, and yet
had so little impact on the Court."
How do we appreciate the "underappreciated" John McLean? It
cannot be through his majority opinions-even the handful of majority
opinions he wrote in important cases, such as Wheaton v. Peters,9
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 10 The Passenger Cases,11 and
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.,1 2 are relatively insignificant.

These cases are famous for the political, economic, and constitutional
issues that brought them to the Court, but not for the jurisprudence or
the reasoning of their majority opinions. Rather, McLean's importance
comes from three aspects of his career: 1) his unusual political
5.
McLean's length of service on the bench seems to be in dispute. Most scholars assert he
was there for thirty-two years, dating from his confirmation on March 7, 1829. E.g., Paul
Finkelman, John McLean, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 293
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2001); Kahn, supra note 4, at 65. This dating is supported by the fact that
McLean's successor as Postmaster General, William T. Barry, was confirmed on March 9, 1829.
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1996, at 6 (Joel D. Treese ed.,
1997). On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court's official website lists him as taking office on
January 30, 1830 and serving until his death on April 4, 1861. Supreme Court of the United
States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). However, the Court has a note appended to
these dates declaring the dates are from an "authority that is questionable, and better authority
would be appreciated." Id. This confusion underscores his ambivalent legacy. Perhaps the
Supreme Court website promotes McLean from among the most underappreciated to among the
most insignificant, if the Supreme Court itself cannot determine when he actually served. See
David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466,
469 (1983) (discussing indicators of insignificance).
6.
At the time, only Justices John Marshall and Joseph Story had served longer. Supreme
Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
7.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1980: AN INDEX TO OPINIONS ARRANGED
BY JUSTICE 75-84 (Linda A. Blandford & Patricia Russell Evans eds., 1983).
8.
Among long-serving Justices, he is surpassed in obscurity only by Gabriel Duvall
(twenty-four years on the bench), Nathan Clifford (twenty-three years), and Thomas Todd
(nineteen years). See Currie, supra note 5, 466 (1983) (discussing the relative "insignificance" of
Supreme Court Justices); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further
Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 481 (1983) (responding to Currie's article).
9.
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654 (1834).
10. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 259 (1837).
11. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 392 (1849).
12. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557 (1852).
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aspirations and activities while serving on the bench; 2) his support
for a national commerce power and a flexible approach to economic
development that contrasted with the states' rights anti-nationalism
of Taney and a majority of the antebellum Court; and 3) his moderate
antislavery jurisprudence, which he combined with a defense of
northern interests on a Court dominated by Southerners and northern
supporters of slavery.
I. THE STRANGE POLITICAL CAREER OF A MINOR JACKSONIAN JUSTICE

McLean was Andrew Jackson's first appointment to the
Supreme Court, and the circumstances of his ascension to the Court
were somewhat bizarre. On August 25, 1828, Justice Robert Trimble
died. 13 President John Quincy Adams did not immediately nominate a
replacement, and in fact, he procrastinated until after Andrew
Jackson had defeated him in the election of 1828. Adams's delay in
nominating Trimble's successor is inexplicable and illustrative of his
lack of political judgment. After the election, the lame-duck Adams
offered the position to Charles Hammond from Ohio, who declined the
appointment, and then to Henry Clay of Kentucky, who also declined.
In December, Adams nominated John C. Crittenden, a former senator
from Kentucky. This nomination, however, was doomed by Adams's
lame-duck status and the emerging Jacksonian majority in the
Senate. In March, Andrew Jackson became President.
The Post Office, with employees everywhere in the country,
was the largest agency in the national government. Indeed, it was the
only federal agency that could be found at the local level throughout
the nation. Because of its size and national scope, and because all
postmasters were patronage appointees, the Post Office was also
considered a critical agency for organizing voters and helping elect
presidential candidates. Because it had huge budgets to build post
roads and build or rent space while postmasters received substantial
amounts of cash in their day-to-day operations, the Post Office was
easily corrupted. McLean had been an enormously competent
Postmaster General, and he cleaned up a great deal of corruption in
contracting for facilities and the construction of post roads. John
Quincy Adams, who came to dislike McLean and believed him disloyal,
nevertheless conceded that McLean was the best and most efficient
Postmaster General in the nation's history.14

13.

Kahn, supra note 4, at 59.

14.

1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1798-1978: THEIR LIVES AND

MAJOR OPINIONS 538 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1980).
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In the period leading up to the 1828 election, Adams considered
McLean guilty of "deep and treacherous duplicity," because he
believed the Postmaster General was using "the extensive patronage"
of his office to "undermine" Adams's reelection bid.15 Adams privately
complained about McLean's "political treachery," but admitted that
McLean "play[ed] his game with so much cunning and duplicity that
[he could] fix upon no positive act that would justify the removal of
him." 16 That Adams felt he needed evidence of this "treachery" to
remove a cabinet member again speaks to the political naivet6 of the
sixth President. It is hard to imagine that any other President would
not remove a cabinet member who the President thought was disloyal.
Whether McLean actively undermined Adams is unclear.
Historian Thomas Carney recently asserted that these accusations
against McLean were "unfounded charges." 17 In defending McLean,
Carney notes that as Postmaster General, McLean "refused to appoint
or remove individuals for purely political reasons," and he similarly
"awarded contracts strictly for the purpose of bettering the operations
of the post office, disregarding the fact that the contract was going to a
political enemy of the administration."1 8 Such nonpartisan behavior
would of course be an admirable trait in a modern Postmaster
General, but in the early nineteenth century, the Post Office was the
most important source of political patronage in the federal
government.' 9 Postmasters General were expected to use that
patronage for the benefit of the President who had appointed them. In
retrospect, McLean's "neutrality" may have been more self-serving
than altruistic. He hoped to use the Post Office, with its thousands of
local postmasters, as a base for his own 1832 presidential campaign.
McLean believed that if he kept all postmasters in their positions in
1828, without regard to their political support for Adams or Jackson,
they would be loyal to him four years later. Not surprisingly, Adams
viewed McLean's neutrality in the election of 1828 as disloyalty while
Jackson correctly understood that McLean's neutrality was a great
boon to his campaign.
Although he was leading a new political coalition that would
soon become the Democratic Party, Jackson asked McLean to continue
15. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (June 3, 1828), 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
23, 25 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876) [hereinafter ADAMS, MEMOIRS].
16. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (July 7, 1828), 8 ADAMS, MEMOIRS, supra note 15, at
51, 51.
17. Thomas Carney, The Political Judge: Justice John McLean's Pursuit of the Presidency,
111 OHIO HIST. 122, 125 (2002).

18.
19.

Id. at 126.
WEISENBURGER, supra note 1, at 46.
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to serve in his cabinet as Postmaster General because McLean was the
most competent Postmaster General who had ever held the office.
Thus, Jackson was prepared to keep McLean in his cabinet even as he
dismissed almost every other person who had served under Adams.
Jackson probably also wanted to keep McLean as Postmaster General
because McLean had national popularity, and, by not using the
powerful patronage of his many thousands of employees to help reelect
Adams, McLean had been helpful to Jackson's election. However,
while keeping McLean in his office, Jackson still expected that as his
Postmaster General, McLean would replace the thousands of local
postmasters appointed under Monroe and Adams with Jackson men.
McLean was reluctant to do this for precisely the same reasons that
kept him from using the Post Office to help Adams get reelected: his
success as Postmaster General required that he keep all honest and
competent local postmasters in office regardless of their political
preferences. This approach also dovetailed with his own presidential
ambitions because the local postmasters formed a loyal base of
supporters for his 1832 presidential campaign.
McLean was willing and perhaps even eager to stay on in
Jackson's administration, but he was unalterably opposed to removing
his own people from the Post Office. Faced with this dilemma, McLean
adroitly convinced Jackson to nominate him for the open seat on the
Supreme Court, which the President did just days after taking office.
For a few days, McLean actually may have been both Postmaster
General and a confirmed member of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Once on the Court, McLean had relatively little impact on
constitutional jurisprudence. He first served under John Marshall,
and like all other Justices on the Marshall Court (except Joseph Story
and William Johnson), McLean labored in the shadow of the Chief
Justice. Marshall's death in 1835 could have led to McLean's
flourishing, but it did not. Chief Justice Taney, while not as
dominating as Marshall, nevertheless tightly controlled the Court and
limited the opportunities of most of his Associate Justices.
Politics also affected McLean's Court career in two ways. First,
McLean was clearly a political outsider on the Taney Court. Although
he was appointed by Jackson, McLean was not actually a Jacksonian
Democrat. In fact, it is hard to figure out what he was. At various
times in his career, he was considered a National Republican, a
Jacksonian Democrat, an Anti-Mason, a Free Democrat, a Whig, a
Free Soiler, a Know-Nothing, a North American, and a Republican
before finally seeking the presidential nomination of the
Constitutional Union Party in 1860. McLean was also a Northerner
who hated slavery on a Court dominated by proslavery Southerners
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and a string of northern doughfaces-northern men with southern
principles-who almost always voted to support slavery. 20 McLean
was hardly a rabid abolitionist, but on the antebellum Court, he stood
out for his relatively strong commitment to freedom and his hostility
to slavery.
Second, in addition to his ambivalent political ideology on the
Jacksonian Court, McLean was also clearly interested in higher office.
His "passion for the presidency ...burned almost as long and torridly"
as Daniel Webster's. 21 As John Quincy Adams noted in his diary,
Justice McLean "thinks of nothing but the Presidency by day and
dreams of nothing else by night."22 McLean's quadrennial quest for the
White House surely affected his position on the Court. When Chief
Justice Taney handed out assignments for majority opinions, he must
have understood that allowing McLean to write an important opinion
would only heighten McLean's political profile. Since McLean and
Taney were not political allies, the Chief Justice had little reason to
support McLean's aspirations.
McLean's pursuit of the presidency began fewer than two years
after he joined the Court. In 1830, the Anti-Masonic Party emerged
because of a growing fear that Masons were a threat to the nation.
The party was a strange coalition built mostly around hatred of
Andrew Jackson (who was a Mason). Among its members were many
men who eventually would become significant political leaders,
including William H. Seward, Thaddeus Stevens, William Sprague,
and Thurlow Weed. Almost immediately the Anti-Masons began to
woo McLean, who initially indicated that he would accept their
nomination for President. On September 26, 1831, the Anti-Masonic
Party held the first national political convention in American history.
In the months leading up to the convention, McLean was the leading
candidate for the nomination, 23 but in early September he suddenly
removed his name from consideration. 24 This left the Anti-Masonic
Convention in disarray. McLean, who clearly had his eye on the White
House, knew he could never get there through an obscure third party.
20. Justice Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57) was the only other Northerner who was even
moderately antislavery appointed after McLean. Smith Thompson (1823-43) and Joseph Story
(1812-45) were the only other northern Justices who were even moderately antislavery who
served with McLean. The term "doughface" implied their faces were made of bread dough and
Southerners could shape them any way they wished.
21.

MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY 261 (1999).

22. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Mar. 14, 1833), 8 ADAMS, MEMOIRS, supra note 15,
at 537, 537 (quoting former Speaker of the House of Representatives John W. Taylor).
23. Diary Entry of John Quincy Adams (Sept. 14, 1831), 8 ADAMS, MEMOIRS, supra note 15,
at 412, 412; WEISENBURGER, supra note 1, at 78-79.
24. WEISENBURGER, supra note 1, at 78-79.
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Four years later McLean actively sought the nomination of the
Whig Party, and as early as 1835, the Whig Party in Ohio officially
endorsed his candidacy. However, McLean proved unacceptable to a
majority of Whigs, who incorrectly believed he was a closet
Jacksonian. Others mistrusted him because he appeared to have no
real political principles at all.25 In the end, the Whigs nominated no
one that year and instead ran four regional candidates in hopes that,
with so many candidates, the election would go to the House of
Representatives, where one of the Whigs could emerge victorious, as
had happened in 1824 when Adams became President. This strategy
failed miserably; Martin Van Buren carried fifteen states and 170
electoral votes, and the four regional candidates cumulatively carried
only eleven states and 124 electoral votes.
In 1840, McLean stood on the sidelines as the popular war
hero, William Henry Harrison, who was also from Ohio, won the Whig
nomination and the presidential election. Harrison died in office only a
month after his inauguration and was succeeded by John Tyler, a
former Democrat who alienated almost every member of the Whig
Party. Tyler offered McLean a cabinet position as Secretary of War,
but McLean decided not to leave the bench.26 He understood that
being a one-term cabinet member in the administration of an
unpopular chief executive, the nation's first unelected President-"His
Accidentcy" as John Quincy Adams acerbically called Tyler-would
not help him get the presidential nomination, which was all he really
wanted. 27 So McLean remained on the bench, waiting for the election
of 1844, which offered him another shot at the White House.
By 1844, McLean had long shed his taint of Jacksonianism and
was acceptable to mainstream northern Whigs. However, Southern
Whigs now distrusted him for his position on slavery. 28 Given his
recent dissent in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,29 this was totally sensible. His
name was put forward as a vice presidential candidate, but he

25. HOLT, supra note 21, at 19; see also Kahn, supra note 4, at 70 (finding that McLean
"wanted to serve the nation and the new administration on his own terms").
26.

WEISENBURGER, supra note 1, at 102.

27. Robert Cover argues that by this time McLean was committed to the bench, and to his
relationship with other Justices, especially Story, and that he would only leave the bench "with
the support of men like Story" for the presidency and not a lesser position. ROBERT COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 245 (1975). Others argue that he

had little interest in the bench or his colleagues, but was only motivated by higher office.
WEISENBURGER, supra note 1, at 101-02.
28. HOLT, supra note 21, at 189.
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 658-73 (1842). For a discussion of Prigg, see infra text
accompanying notes 97-99.
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withdrew himself from consideration. The Whig ticket of Clay and
Frelinghuysen lost in a close election. 30
In 1846, Justice McLean actively began to seek the Whig
nomination for the 1848 election. He wrote letters, dined with
important politicians, and had his supporters reach out to Whigs
across the nation. He tried to sell himself as the last remnant of the
founding era-a veteran of James Monroe's Administration who could
rise above party politics and partisanship. By March 1846 he seemed
like the candidate to beat. But the Mexican War changed all of this,
and General Zachary Taylor's victory at Buena Vista in February 1847
made Taylor the most logical Whig candidate. McLean's presidential
bid also was hampered by his position on the Court, which made it
impossible for him to actively campaign, give speeches, or take
positions publicly on a number of issues. At the Whig Convention,
which met from June 7 to June 9, McLean's name was put forward,
31
but he received only two votes on the first ballot and none after that.
Having lost the Whig nomination, McLean still had a shot at
running for President as the candidate of the newly created Free Soil
Party. The Free Soilers emphatically opposed the spread of slavery
into the territories recently acquired from Mexico, but they were not
abolitionists and avoided an extreme antislavery position that would
have alienated most northern voters.
McLean's connection to the free soil movement predated the
formal creation of the party by that name in 1848. In October 1847,
before the Free Soil Party was created, Charles Sumner of
Massachusetts asked Salmon P. Chase of Ohio "how much AntiSlavery there is in Judge McLean." 32 Sumner, a dedicated foe of
slavery, declared, "I have strong personal predilections in his favor. I
honor his character." 33 At the time Sumner was considering McLean
as a candidate for the Liberty Party, but within a few months,
Sumner's interest in that party was eclipsed by the formation of the
Free Soil Party.
Chase's response to Sumner was complicated. In the 1840s,
Chase, who lived in Cincinnati, emerged as the preeminent

30. The uncommon name of the vice presidential candidate led to one of the great rhyming
slogans of American politics: "Hurray Hurray, the Country's Risin'; Vote for Clay and
Frelinghuysen."
31. 2 JAMES T. HAVEL, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTIONS: BIOGRAPHICAL
AND HISTORICAL GUIDE 24 (1996).

32. Letter from Charles Sumner to Salmon P. Chase (Oct. 1, 1847), in Beverley Wilson
Palmer, From Small Minority to Great Cause: Letters of Charles Sumner to Salmon P. Chase, 93
OHIO HIST. 164, 169 (1998).
33.

Id.
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antislavery lawyer in the nation, earning him the nickname "the
Attorney General for Fugitive Slaves." He often appeared before
McLean when the Justice was riding circuit, and he often lost in
slavery-related cases. In 1843, McLean ruled against him in Jones v.
Van Zandt.34 Consistent with his understanding of the Constitution
and his obligations as a Justice, McLean upheld the Fugitive Slave
Act of 179335 on circuit in the case, as he would in other fugitive slave
cases. 36 In 1847, McLean voted with the majority to uphold Jones v.
Van Zandt in the Supreme Court.3 7 This was Chase's first Supreme
Court case, and although he did not actually go to Washington to
argue it, he did produce an impressive printed brief of more than one
hundred pages that he sent to scores of lawyers and antislavery
activists around the nation. 38 Chase surely had reason to doubt
McLean's commitment to antislavery.
On the other hand, McLean also had dissented forcefully from
Justice Joseph Story's overwhelmingly proslavery majority opinion in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,39 and he had vigorously defended the rights of
northern states to prevent the introduction of slaves by Southerners
sojourning in the Free States in Groves v. Slaughter.40 McLean's
opinions in both cases stood in marked contrast to the proslavery
jurisprudence of most members of the Court. In Prigg, McLean
countered the proslavery opinion of Joseph Story, the Justice from
41
Massachusetts who most Americans thought was antislavery.
McLean may not have been as strong an opponent of slavery as Chase
34. Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1046 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501); Jones v. Van
Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1054 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7502) [hereinafter Van Zandt Il].
35. Fugitive Slave Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
36. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. at 1044; Van Zandt II, 13 F. Cas. at 1052; see also Driskell v.
Parish, 7 F. Cas. 1095, 1096 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 4088) (upholding the Fugitive Slave Act by
implication); Driskell v. Parish. 7 F. Cas. 1093, 1095 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 4087) (same);
Driskell v. Parish, 7 F. Cas. 1100, 1100-01 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 4089) (same); Greathouse v.
Dunlap, 10 F. Cas. 1062, 1063 (3 McLean 303) (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 5742) (same).
37. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 232 (1847).
38. SALMON P. CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
DEFENDANT, SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE DECEMBER
TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WHARTON JONES VS. JOHN VAN ZANDT (1847). For a discussion of

Chase's printed brief, see PAUL FINKELMAN,

SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 70-75 (1985)

[hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM].

39.
40.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 658-74 (1842).
Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 464-469 (1841); see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN

IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY 268 (1981) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, AN

IMPERFECT UNION] ("His purpose was to protect the right of Ohio and the rest of the North to
exclude slaves and slavery.").
41. Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice
Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 [hereinafter Finkelman, Story
Telling].
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wished, but he was clearly the only opponent of slavery on the high
Court.
Chase's personal relationship with McLean further complicated
his response to Sumner. Despite the Van Zandt case, Chase had long
admired McLean. By 1847, after marrying a niece of McLean's wife,
Chase was also one of McLean's relatives. 42 Surely, for both political
and personal reasons, Chase wanted his kinsman and fellow Ohioan to
reach the White House. Furthermore, by early winter in 1848, the
major slavery-related issue for Chase and Sumner was not fugitive
slaves but the spread of slavery into the territories. Sumner believed
that "[i]f Judge McLean could be induced to take any practical ground
against the extension of Slavery, he would be a popular candidate,"
and that McLean running for President with John Hale of New
Hampshire would be a "strong ticket."43 Chase, who would later
become Chief Justice under Lincoln, agreed. He wanted McLean to be
the Free Soil Party's presidential candidate because the Justice was
"the most reliable man, on the slavery question, now prominent in
either party."4 4 He reminded Sumner that McLean had not only
endorsed the principles of the Wilmot Proviso, but had gone on to
assert that "neither" a resolution like the Proviso "nor legislation is
needed to establish the principle" that slavery could not exist in the
federal territories because such a ban on slavery was "in the
Constitution." 45 Chase agreed that McLean did "not fully agree with
those who are generally known as antislavery men," but that "on the
question of extension of slavery he is with us, not only on the question
of its impolicy and its criminality, but also because he believed such
extension would be a clear infraction of the Constitution." 46 Chase
supported McLean for the Free Soil nomination, despite his "great
error" in Jones v. Van Zandt.47 Thus, Chase urged Sumner to inform

42. Chase had recently remarried for the third time, and his new wife was the niece of
McLean's second wife. COVER, supranote 27, at 246.
43. Letter from Charles Sumner to Salmon P. Chase (Feb. 7, 1848), in 1 THE SELECTED
LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER 206, 206 (Beverly Wilson Palmer ed., 1990).

44.

Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner (Feb. 19, 1848), in Diary and

Correspondence of Salmon P. Chase, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL

ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1902, at 131 (1903)

[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; see also

FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS 58 (1987) (indicating that Chase

hoped McLean would receive the Free Soil Party nomination).
45. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner (Feb. 19, 1848), in 2 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 44, at 130. Proposed by Congressman David Wilmot of Pennsylvania, the Proviso
would have prohibited slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico during the Mexican War.
The Proviso passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.
46. Id. at 131.
47.

Id.
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people in New England that McLean could be trusted on the central
issue of the election: the spread of slavery into the territories. Chase
later wrote that he had spoken with McLean and that he was
"emphatically right on the Free Territory Question, nearer right than
any so prominent man of the old parties I know, on many others; and
48
right on principle and not from impulses."
The Free Soilers met in Buffalo, New York, on August 9 and
10, and although McLean might have had a shot at a place on the
ticket, after having openly sought the Whig nomination, he refused to
49
allow his name to be put forward at the convention of another party.
Furthermore, once again McLean seems to have had an aversion to
third parties, as he had when he rejected the overtures of the AntiMasonic Party in 1832. A lifetime seat on the Supreme Court-the
ultimate political sinecure in the United States-surely was better
than a quixotic run for the White House on a third-party ticket that
was bound to lose. McLean's instincts were correct: the Whigs won the
presidential election in 1848.
In Ohio the political divisions were extraordinarily close.
Neither the Democrats nor the Whigs had a majority in the
legislature, and a handful of Free Soilers held the balance of power.
The Whigs could have controlled the Ohio legislature if they had made
an alliance with the Free Soilers. This would have led to the election
of an antislavery Whig to the U.S. Senate. But, in the end the Whigs
could not come to an agreement with the Free Soilers. Had McLean
become a Free Soiler in 1848, the Free Soilers in the Ohio legislature
might have struck a deal with the Whigs that would have sent
McLean to the U.S. Senate. 50 Instead, the Free Soilers attempted to
persuade the Whigs in the legislature to send Congressman Joshua
Giddings to the Senate. Giddings had been a Whig before joining the
Free Soil Party, but the Whigs in the legislature refused to support
him for the Senate. Even without joining the Free Soil Party,
McLean's supporters still hoped the state legislature might resolve the
impasse by settling on McLean as a senator who could appeal to
Whigs, Democrats, and Free Soilers. But the Byzantine politics of the
Ohio legislature made that impossible. In the end, the Ohio legislature
chose McLean's long-time supporter and kinsman, Salmon P. Chase,

48. Letter from Salmon P. Chase to Charles Sumner (Mar. 25, 1848), in 2 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 44, at 132.
49. BLUE, supra note 44, at 64-65.
50. At the time, before the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, the state legislatures
elected U.S. Senators.
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as the senator from Ohio, while McLean remained on the bench as the
51
Justice from Ohio.
McLean almost avoided the election of 1852 altogether. He was
no longer seeking the Whig nomination, and the Free Soil Party,
whose nomination he might have received in 1848, was now all but
defunct. The remaining active antislavery politicians met in
Pittsburgh on August 11, 1852, to nominate candidates for the Free
Soil Democratic Party. This party included former Democrats who
could no longer stomach the proslavery positions of the official
Democratic Party, antislavery Whigs who had left the party, and Free
Soilers. Their potential candidates for President included successful
officeholders like Senators Salmon P. Chase and John Hale and
radical antislavery activists like Gerrit Smith of New York. McLean,
at age sixty-seven, was now willing to consider a third-party
candidacy. Most likely, he understood that at his age he had to run
soon or he would never realize his dream of becoming President. Thus,
in 1852, he allowed his name to be put forward to the Free Soil
Democratic Party. His was one of the seven names offered at the
convention, but McLean won few votes, and the convention chose John
P. Hale. In the general election, Hale polled slightly more than
52
150,000 votes out of the more than three million cast.
By 1856 the Whig Party was an artifact of history. Most Whigs
had joined the new Republican Party, but a few did not. Former
President Millard Fillmore, for instance, ran as the candidate of the
anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant American Party, which was commonly
called the Know-Nothing Party. McLean, at age seventy-one, seemed
desperate to get a nomination, so he tentatively offered himself to the
Know-Nothings and received eleven votes at that party's convention in
February 1856. Denied the chance to run as a Know-Nothing, McLean
then made himself available to the North American Party, which had
split off from the American (Know-Nothing) Party. But the North
Americans nominated Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts, who
eventually withdrew from the campaign to support the Republican
candidate.
At this time in history, party membership was fluid and
affiliations changed quickly. McLean was unalterably hostile to the
Democratic Party, which had become a proslavery bastion, and he
seemed to be willing to run as the presidential candidate of any party
that opposed the Democrats. After failing to be nominated by either of
the nativist parties, McLean became an active candidate at the
51.
52.

BLUE, supra note 44, at 61-73; HOLT, supra note 21, at 400.
2 HAVEL, supra note 31, at 26-27.
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Republican Convention, which ran from June 17 to June 19. At age
seventy-one, he was the senior statesman of the new party and an
attractive candidate who could appeal to Know-Nothings, former
Whigs, Westerners (today's "Midwest" was then the West), and
moderate opponents of slavery. He came from Ohio, a very large state,
and was popular in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Illinois-three
conservative states that the party needed to win the election. Unlike
his leading opponent for the nomination, John C. Fr6mont, McLean
was an experienced politician who had been in Washington for three
decades.5 3 Despite his strengths, McLean lacked the charisma, fame,
and charm of Fr6mont, the heroic western explorer and soldier. On an
informal first ballot, McLean finished with 196 votes, second to
Fremont's 359 votes. 54 After a formal vote, Fremont gained the
55
nomination by acclamation.
The 1856 Republican Convention was the closest McLean ever
came to winning a presidential nomination. But in 1860, at age
seventy-five, he made one more run. With the party system and the
nation collapsing, a motley collection of former Whigs, KnowNothings, and moderate Democrats organized the Constitutional
Union Party. 56 The new party met in Baltimore on May 9 and 10, and
on the first ballot, McLean finished sixth among ten candidates, with
nineteen votes. On the second ballot, the party nominated John Bell, a
former senator from Tennessee. Not quite finished as a presidential
candidate, Justice McLean's name was put forward at the Republican
Convention in Chicago a week later. On the first ballot, McLean ran
seventh among thirteen candidates with twelve votes. On the third
ballot, Lincoln won the nomination, but McLean was one of seven
candidates still in contention, running fifth with a few convention
votes. 57

53.

WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856, at 311-17

(1987); 2 HAVEL, supra note 31, at 28-30.
54. Carney, supra note 17, at 140-44, argues that McLean's supporter Rufus P. Spalding
precipitously withdrew McLean's name as a candidate and thus destroyed his chance of winning
the nomination. Carney argues that Spaulding was in fact secretly supporting Fremont. Id.
Despite the evidence Carney marshals that Spalding undermined McLean, the best evidence
remains that McLean could not have won the nomination over the more charismatic Fremont.
For a contrary view, see GIENAPP, supra note 53, 338-41.
55. 2 HAVEL, supra note 31, at 30. Abraham Lincoln was one of the candidates for the vice
presidential nomination.
56. As if to underscore the utter confusion of party politics at this time, the Constitutional
Union Party officially called itself the American Party, the same official name the KnowNothings used in 1856.
57. 2 HAVEL, supra note 31, at 31-33.
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Within less than a year of the Republican Convention, McLean
would be dead. He had been on the Court for thirty-two years, and for
almost all of that time, he had been campaigning for President or Vice
President. He had been considered a viable candidate by at least eight
different parties, and at least three times his name had been put
forward at more than one political convention in the same year. This
is a record of sorts that has been unmatched by any political figure in
the history of the nation. What makes this record even more
remarkable is that throughout this period McLean was a Justice on
the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. A CAREER ON THE COURT: COMMERCE AND THE ECONOMY
While seemingly always running for President, McLean was
also sitting on the bench, deciding cases. As a Justice, he was almost
always in the shadow of other more prominent jurists-especially
Marshall, Story, and Taney. Even his most important opinion, his
dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, was overshadowed by the
unexpectedly strong dissent of the conservative Whig, Benjamin
Robbins Curtis. 58 McLean's career on the Court was also affected by
his odd political relationship with Chief Justices Marshall and Taney.
When he joined the Court, McLean's political views and positions were
between those of a National Republican in the tradition of James
Monroe and those of a moderate Jacksonian Democrat. At the same
time, his flirtation in 1831-32 with the Anti-Masonic Party, which was
virulently anti-Jacksonian, must have made him something of an
anathema to men like Taney who were close to Jackson and revered
the President.
On the bench, McLean was more inclined to support states'
rights than Marshall; he dissented in Craig v. Missouri, the case in
which Chief Justice Marshall held that the Constitution barred the
states from issuing certificates and promissory notes that could
circulate like money. 59 McLean was in the minority in that case, but in
Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, he wrote the majority opinion that
effectively reversed Craig.60 This was probably his most important
majority opinion, and it might have redeemed him in the eyes of
Jacksonians like Taney who agreed with the opinion. McLean was not,
however, totally supportive of states' rights, and he concurred with
Marshall's majority opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, agreeing that

58.
59.
60.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 564-94 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 411 (1830).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 323-24, 327 (1837).
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Georgia had no jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation. 61 Given
62
President Jackson's aggressive stance against Indian rights,
McLean's vote in Worcester must have thoroughly annoyed the man
who put him on the Court.
In 1836, the center chair on the Court was vacant; Marshall
had died and no one had been appointed to replace him. For this brief
moment, McLean was able to take a leadership role on the Court. In
his majority opinion in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States,
McLean took a moderate states' rights position, upholding the notion
that, once a territory becomes a state, it has sovereign control over all
its land unless the national government specifically retains claims to
that land.6 3 Although it is seldom read and barely remembered, Mayor
of New Orleans was a significant opinion settling an important issue
for western states like Louisiana and McLean's home state of Ohio.
The opinion fell to McLean, the only Westerner on the Court.
If McLean was not entirely in agreement with Marshall, he
soon discovered he also was not particularly close to Marshall's
successor, Chief Justice Taney. His first important opinion under
Taney, in Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, dovetailed with Jacksonian
ideology, as the Court allowed Kentucky to charter a bank that could
issue its own currency.6 4 Here Taney and McLean led a 6-1 majority
with only Story dissenting. But later in the term, in Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, McLean joined Story in arguing that the
charter of the Charles River Bridge Company gave it an implied
monopoly. Taney's majority opinion rejected the claim that the
company charter protected it from the competition of the newly
constructed Warren Bridge.6 5 McLean's position in this case indicates
he clearly was not an orthodox Jacksonian on economic issues.
McLean also joined the majority (but did not write the opinion)
in voting against Jacksonian interests in Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes. 66 Although the case was decided after Jackson left office,
the Court rejected claims of executive privilege by Jackson's former
Postmaster General, Amos Kendall, who argued that he could not be
compelled by a writ of mandamus to take certain actions. Kendall had
refused to spend funds specifically appropriated by Congress to pay
61.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).

62.

See generally ROBERT REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS 277-81 (2001)

(discussing President Jackson's legacy and his belief that the nation's well-being required
removal of the Native American tribes).
63. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736-37 (1836).
64. 36 U.S. at 349.
65. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 583 (1837).
66. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 608 (1838).
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money owed to Stokes. Taney and two other Jacksonians dissented.
Kendell might be seen as a precursor to the failed attempts of later
67
Presidents to sequester appropriated funds rather than spend them.
The decision was Whiggish in its deference to the legislature and its
opposition to executive power. The case had a taint of scandal
stemming from the Jackson Administration, and the majority opinion
was clearly a rebuke of the former President, his successor Martin
Van Buren, and the Democratic Party.
McLean's lone dissent in Bronson v. Kinzie68 can also be seen
as a precursor to modern constitutional law. The case involved a
contract for the purchase of land in Chicago and fallout from the two
economic crises of the period, the Panic of 1837 and the longer
depression that ran from 1839-43. While historians are not fully in
agreement about the causes of these two economic downturns, all
agree that they either were caused or exacerbated by the banking and
currency policies of Andrew Jackson and his close advisor and shortterm Secretary of the Treasury, Roger B. Taney. 69 Bronson sold
various lots in Chicago to Kinzie and then sought to foreclose on the
mortgages when Kinzie, in the wake of the Panic, could not make his
payments. An Illinois law passed in the wake of the panics gave land
purchasers a year to redeem land lost to foreclosures and prohibited
foreclosure sales unless the land sold for at least two-thirds of its
appraised value. On circuit, McLean upheld this law, but in a 5-1
decision, the Court reversed McLean and held that the Illinois law
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. The Democratic
majority led by Taney reflected the Jacksonian opposition to
bankruptcy laws. Jackson's economic and banking policies that had
been implemented by Taney when he was Secretary of Treasury were
in part responsible for the Panic and the Kinzie case. 70 As Chief
Justice, Taney struck down laws meant to counteract the harms
caused by the policies he had helped develop and implement while
serving in Jackson's cabinet. McLean, in a prescient dissent, argued
that the Illinois law did not abrogate the contract but only modified

67. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 48 (1975) (finding executive did not have
authority to allocate less funds to the states than were allocated by Congress); Train v.
Campaign Clean Water, Inc., 420 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1975) (same).
68. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 322 (1843).
69. See Jenny B. Wahl, He Broke the Bank, but Did Andrew Jackson also Father the Fed?,
in CONGRESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SECTIONALISM: FROM THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE TO THE

AGE OF JACKSON 188, 188-220 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2008) (discussing
Andrew Jackson's destruction of the Second Bank of the United States and how that decision
affected both the Panic of 1837 and Crisis of 1839).
70. Id.
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the method of collecting on it. McLean's position reflected Whig
economic ideology, which favored bankruptcy laws and government
intervention to help mitigate economic downturns. Nearly a century
later, in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,71 the Court
effectively adopted McLean's position.
While on the bench, McLean became increasingly nationalistic,
reflecting his growing Whig proclivities. He wrote the majority opinion
in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,72 settling a boundary dispute
between those two states. The entire Court agreed that the
established boundary should not be changed. But unlike McLean,
Chief Justice Taney argued the Court never should have taken
jurisdiction over the case in the first place. Similarly, in Planters'
Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, McLean wrote a separate concurrence to
the majority opinion striking down an 1840 Mississippi law that
banned banks from selling notes to other banks. McLean's separate
opinion stressed that the Planters' Bank charter of 1830 specifically
gave the bank this right, and thus the state law could not take this
right away without violating the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution. 73 This position was similar to McLean's dissent in
Charles River Bridge because it supported vested charter rights under
the Contracts Clause. 74 Taney and Justice Peter V. Daniel dissented
75
in Planters'Bankon classic states' rights grounds.
In Commerce Clause cases, McLean also departed from Taney,
who increasingly chipped away at national power. In the Passenger
Cases, McLean wrote the lead opinion because he was the senior
Justice in a 5-4 majority. 76 The opinion struck down as a violation of
the Commerce Clause state laws in New York and Massachusetts that
taxed immigrants. 77 The states' rights Jacksonians-Taney, Daniel,
Samuel Nelson, and Levi Woodbury-dissented. 78 The moderate
Jacksonian nationalists-James Wayne, Robert Grier, and John

71. 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934) (holding that a provision of the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law, which temporarily extended the allotted time for redeeming real property from
foreclosure and sale under existing mortgages, "was addressed to a legitimate end, that is, the
legislation was not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a
basic interest of society").
72. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 628 (1846).
73. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 344 (1848).
74. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420, 583 (1837).
75. 47 U.S. at 334.
76. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 392 (1849).
77. Id. at 408-09.
78. Id. at 464, 494, 518.
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Catron-joined McLean. 79 McLean's position modified the Court's
expansive notion of state police powers articulated in Mayor of New
York v. Miln, a case in which a much younger McLean had endorsed
the notion of state police powers that allowed for the regulation of
international commerce at the local level.80 There, the Court had
upheld a New York law requiring ship captains to provide New York
City officials with information on immigrants who were brought into
the city. The Passenger Cases involved an actual tax, rather than a
mere reporting system as in Mayor of New York v. Miln, which is
probably why moderate Jacksonians like Wayne, Catron, and Grier
joined McLean in striking down the laws.
A few years later, McLean dissented in Cooley v. Board of Port
8 1 a case in which the
Wardens of Philadelphia,
Jacksonian states'
rights majority further expanded local commerce power at the expense
of national power. The law at issue required ships entering
Philadelphia's port to hire local pilots. A majority of the Justices saw
this as a local regulation consistent with the police powers of the
states.8 2 McLean saw it as an attempt to usurp congressional
commerce power and, in effect, provide a monopoly for local pilots.83
Finally, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
McLean spoke for a 7-2 majority, with Taney and Daniel dissenting, in
an opinion that held that Virginia did not have the power to authorize
the construction of a bridge across the Ohio River if the bridge

79. Id. at 410-11. The oddest vote in this case was Justice John McKinley's. He was a
states' rights, proslavery Alabamian of little distinction, who logically would have been expected
to support the right of states to tax immigrants, as did Daniel and Taney. Like Daniel and
Taney, McKinley believed the southern states had a concurrent right to exclude free blacks. He
further believed that McLean's position would threaten the rights of the southern states to
"repulse" or "tax the nuisance" of free blacks from "Jamaica, Hayti, or Africa." Id. at 508.
McKinley, however, concluded that the "migration and importation" clause of Article I, Section 9,
of the Constitution precluded the states from taxing migrants after 1808. Id. at 453-55.
McKinley argued that the states could not prohibit migrants and immigrants, but that only
Congress could. Id. His agenda may have been based on his hostility to northern laws
emancipating slaves brought into the free states by visiting slaveowners. At the time, the right of
transit with slaves was emerging as a far more important issue to the South than the right to
exclude free blacks, which the southern states had successfully been doing for nearly three
decades. See generally FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 41, at 19 (1981) (discussing
late antebellum legal jurisprudence and analyzing how legal institutions, including the Supreme
Court, attempted to cope with the legal and ethical conundrums posed by the existence of a
Union that included both free and slave states).
80. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 143 (1837) (upholding a New York statute requiring all vessels to
file a passenger report upon entering to the port of New York as a rightful exercise of New York's
state police powers).
81. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 321 (1852).
82. Id. at 313-14.
83. Id. at 324.
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interfered with interstate traffic on the river-as the bridge at issue
did. 4 Virginia had chartered the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge
Company to build a railroad bridge across the Ohio River.8 5 The bridge
was so low, however, that it interfered with steamships on the river,
forcing them to remove their smoke stacks to navigate under the
bridge.8 6 Speaking for the Court, McLean held that this violated the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.8 7 Taney and
Daniel, reflecting a narrow states' rights vision of the Constitution,
88
argued that the Court had no jurisdiction in the case.
In general, McLean emerged as a moderate nationalist on
commercial issues, and he kept alive the tradition of Marshall and
Story that Congress and the Constitution were superior to the states.
In this context, he often resisted the states' rights, anti-nationalist
thrust of some of Taney's jurisprudence. Similarly, like Story and
Marshall, McLean was more likely to support vested economic
interests, which was almost always a minority position on the Taney
Court. Beyond this context, however, his disagreements with Taney
and the majority of the Court were often minor, and in the majority of
cases, McLean voted with Taney and the other Jacksonians in
commercial and economic issues. For example, McLean joined the
majority in Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,8 9 which expanded
federal admiralty jurisdiction. Similarly, in the first Wheeling Bridge
case, 90 McLean joined an eight-man majority, with only the extreme
states' rights Justice, Daniel, dissenting. As noted above, McLean
wrote the majority opinion in the second Wheeling Bridge case 9' and
was joined by five other Jacksonians, but not the two most extreme
states' rights Jacksonians, Chief Justice Taney and Associate Justice
Peter V. Daniel. McLean wrote a separate concurring opinion in West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix92 upholding the right of Vermont to take a
bridge by eminent domain. McLean agreed with the Court that this
was a constitutionally permissible taking and not a violation of the
84. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 557 (1852). See generally ELIZABETH BRAND MONROE, THE
WHEELING BRIDGE CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND TECHNOLOGY xvi (1992)

(discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. and theorizing that "[t]he resolution
of the conflict inherent in government support of both land and water transportation sheds new
light on the role played by law in the evolution of transportation technology").
85. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. at 530.
86. Id. at 534-35.
87. Id. at 566.
88. Id. at 580 (Taney, J., dissenting); id. at 594 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
89. 53 (12 How.) U.S. 443 (1852).
90. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 647 (1850).
91. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852).
92. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
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Contracts Clause, as had been the case in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.93 Similarly, in an important tax case, Dobbins v.
Commissioners of Erie County,9 4 the Court unanimously ruled that
federal officials were immune from state taxation. This decision
reaffirmed Marshall's holding in McCulloch v. Maryland.95 These and
other cases illustrate that while McLean was closer to Marshall,
Story, and federalist jurisprudence, he was only sometimes an outlier
on the Taney Court on issues of economics and commerce.
On slavery and race, however, McLean carved out a
jurisprudence that was markedly different from almost all the other
members of the Court.
III. MCLEAN AND SLAVERY: A LONE ANTISLAVERY VOICE IN A SEA OF
PROSLAVERY JURISTS

For most of his time on the bench, McLean was a Northerner
on a Court dominated by Southerners. Moreover, with a few
exceptions, most of the Northerners on the Court were classic
doughfaces-including Henry Baldwin, Samuel Nelson, Robert Grier,
Levi Woodbury, and Nathan Clifford-who almost always voted with
their southern colleagues on cases involving slavery. 96 Even Joseph
Story, who privately disliked slavery, sometimes supported the
institution more than was necessary for deciding the immediate legal
97
issues before him. Story's majority opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania
was the second most proslavery opinion in the Court's history, 9
surpassed only by Taney's opinion in Dred Scott. Story's famed opinion
in The Amistad99 reached an antislavery result (the Africans on that
ship were declared free), but the logic of the opinion was hardly
antislavery. Overwhelming evidence presented in the lower court
showed that the alleged slaves on the ship were African-born and had
been imported to Cuba illegally. Thus, Story upheld the lower court's
conclusion that the Africans on the ship had to be freed because they
were not legally slaves. Story indicated in his opinion, however, that
he would have been fully prepared to return the Africans to Cuba if
93.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

94. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
96. See supra note 20.
97. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 608 (1842).
98. Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J 605 (1993)
[hereinafter Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania]; Finkelman, Story Telling, supra
note 41, at 252-56.
99. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 587 (1841).
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they had legally been slaves in Cuba. Indeed, buried in that opinion
was the holding that the Cuban-born slave who served as the cabin
boy on The Amistad was in fact to be returned to his master.
On the Court, McLean stood out for his opposition to slavery.
Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri said that McLean was
"abolitionist enough for any body outside of a mad house-& his wife
is abolitionist enough for all those who ought to be in one." 100 This was
surely an exaggeration, at least about McLean. 101 He enforced the
Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793102 and 1850103 as a Circuit Justice and on
the Supreme Court in such cases as Jones v. Van Zandt,10 4 Norris v.
Newton, 10 5 and Ableman v. Booth. 10 6 He understood that the
Constitution contained compromises over slavery, at least with regard
to fugitive slaves, and that the courts were obligated to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Clause and the laws passed to enforce it.
McLean faced slavery in two contexts: as a Circuit Justice
hearing cases in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, and as a
Supreme Court Justice, reviewing cases on appeal. Because his circuit
included the lower Midwest, he heard more fugitive slave cases than
any other Justice. This forced him to make a critical distinction
between his roles. As a Circuit Justice he was able to develop the law
in cases of first impression, but when the Supreme Court had already
ruled on an issue, he was obligated, as a conscientious jurist, to follow
the high court. Thus, he applied precedents and interpretations even if
he disagreed with them. On the Supreme Court, however, he was
more of a policymaker and was thus free to interpret the Constitution
and the federal laws according to his own conscience and judicial
theory. The result was an apparent contradiction-but only an
apparent contradiction-between the Circuit Justice who upheld the
compromises over slavery and the Supreme Court Justice who used all

100. GIENAPP, supra note 53, at 314 (1987) (quoting Thomas Hart Benton).
101. His second wife, Sarah Ludlow Garrard, was the daughter of one of the Lane rebels and
was very much a committed abolitionist. The Lane rebels were a group of young men who left
Lane seminary to "evangelize" for antislavery. ROBERT H. ABZUG, PASSIONATE LIBERATOR:
THEODORE DWIGHT WELD AND THE DILEMMA OF REFORM 74-122 (1980); GILBERT HOBBS BARNES,
THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE 1830-1844, at 74-78 (1933).

102. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
103. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
104. 13 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501), aff'd, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
105. 18 F. Cas. 322 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307). For a more in-depth discussion of this
case, see Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value of
"JusticeDelayed," 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 89 (1992) [hereinafter Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves]. He
also upheld the 1793 law in Greathouse v. Dunlap, 10 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No.
5742), and Driskell v. Parish,7 F. Cas. 1100 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 4089).
106. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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the tools available to him to challenge slavery. Yet, even on the
Supreme Court, McLean recognized that the Constitution had made
some compromises over slavery and that he was obligated to
implement them. The end result was that McLean clearly was not
"abolitionist enough" 10 7 for true abolitionists, but he was emphatically
the most antislavery member of the antebellum Court.
McLean's personal views on slavery were probably very much
like those of Lincoln, who claimed he was "naturally antislavery" and
could "not remember when" he "did not so think, and feel."10 8 McLean
doubtless would have agreed with Lincoln's declaration that "[i]f
slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong." 10 9 In the first opinion he ever
wrote on slavery, at the age of thirty-two, McLean asserted that
"SLAVERY, except for the punishment of crimes, is an infringement
upon the sacred rights of man: Rights, which are derived from his
Creator, and which are inalienable."' 11 0 McLean never wavered from
this position, which he had articulated while on the Ohio Supreme
Court. But, like Lincoln, McLean was constrained by fidelity to a
Constitution that protected slavery in significant ways.1 11 Throughout
his judicial career, McLean struggled harder than any other federal
judge to work around these constraints.
A. Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance on the Ohio Supreme Court
McLean's first encounter with slavery came in Ohio v.
Carneal,1 12 a habeas corpus action that arose while he was on the Ohio
Supreme Court. McLean articulated his opposition to slavery, but he
also acknowledged:
From the nature of our federal compact, and the laws of our national
legislature, this Court are [sic] bound to respect as property, to a certain
extent, that which is made property by the laws of a sister state, however
repugnant, in our conception, to justice, and contrary to the policy of our own
laws.

113

Thus, he noted that Ohio was obligated to return fugitive slaves to
their masters, but, taking a position he would maintain on the U.S.

107. GIENAPP, supra note 53, at 314.
108. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 281, 281 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
109. Id.
110. Ohio v. Carneal, in OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS, PRIOR TO 1823, at 133, 135
(Ervin H. Pollack ed., 1952).
111. For a discussion of the proslavery aspects of the Constitution, see PAUL FINKELMAN,
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 3-10 (2d ed. 2001).
112. Ohio v. Carneal, supra note 110.
113. Id. at 135.
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Supreme Court, he also asserted that "[t]he right of a citizen of
Kentucky to the possession and service of his slave, when presented
for judicial investigation, must be tested, like every other right, by the
laws governing the case."1 1 4 In other words, McLean insisted that
claims to slaves, including fugitive slaves, required due process and
evidence. The right of the master had to be proven before the freedom
of a black man would be lost.
After setting out these general principles in Carneal, McLean
turned to the issue at hand, which involved a black man named
Richard Lunsford who was claimed as a slave by Thomas D. Carneal,
a resident of Cincinnati. Carneal's father had lived and died in
Kentucky, and at his death all of the senior Carneal's property passed
to his wife. The defendant Thomas D. Carneal, as the administrator of
his father's estate, claimed Lunsford. After a careful examination of
the complicated facts of the case, McLean concluded that Carneal did
not have good title to Lunsford under Kentucky law, and thus he could
not hold Lunsford against his will. Lunsford was set free.
McLean followed this technical analysis with a long discussion
of slavery in Ohio. He asserted that "according to the immutable
principles of natural justice" every slave was "entitled to his freedom"
and "that which had its origin in usurpation and fraud, can never be
sanctified into a right." 115 As a state judge, McLean had "sworn to
support the Constitution of the United States" and was prepared to do
so, but he would not go beyond what was required. 116 McLean was
uncertain whether masters had a right of transit through the states
with their slaves in tow or whether "every slave who sets his foot
within the state [of Ohio] with his master's consent" was free. 117 But
he was certain that "if a man remove into this state with the intention
of becoming a resident, and bring with him his slaves, one day, or one
hour," such actions would be "sufficient to manumit them."1 1 8 This had
been the case with Lunsford, marking yet another reason that he was
free. Even if Carneal had good title to Lunsford under Kentucky law,
he had lost ownership of him by bringing him into Ohio because "[n]o
citizen ought to introduce, either directly or indirectly, that which the
[Ohio] constitution expressly prohibits."1 1 9

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 139.
Id.

Id.

118. Id.

119. Id. at 141.

2009]

JOHNMCLEAN

543

McLean's position was clear: if a citizen of Ohio owned a slave
in Kentucky, he could not legally bring that slave into Ohio. Nor could
a visitor bring a slave into the state and use the slave's services:
"[W]herever the master seeks a profit, by the labor of this slave in this
state, he forfeits all right to the possession and services of such
slave. ' 120 Slavery, in McLean's view, violated all natural law as well as
the Ohio Constitution and could only be protected in Ohio to the
extent the federal Constitution required such protection.
The issues raised in Carneal would reemerge when McLean
went to the U.S. Supreme Court and faced two interrelated issues: the
status of fugitive slaves and the status of slaves in free territories.
These issues led to his two most important opinions-his powerful
dissents in Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Dred Scott v. Sandford.
B. Fugitive Slaves and their Abolitionist Allies
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, decided in 1842, was jurisprudentially
the most important slavery-related case until Dred Scott in 1857.121
Prigg was the first case that the Court heard under the Fugitive Slave
Clause of the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.122 With
123
an enormously complex analysis of the Fugitive Slave Clause,
Justice Story upheld the 1793 law, struck down Pennsylvania's 1826
Personal Liberty Law, and by extension struck down all other state
personal liberty laws. 124 These laws were designed to protect free
blacks from kidnappings, in part by providing due process protections
to alleged fugitive slaves. Most importantly, Story nationalized the
law of slavery, giving masters a common law right to seize fugitive
slaves without any judicial superintendence if they could accomplish
125
the seizure without a "breach of the peace or any illegal violence."
Story also held that while state officials ought to enforce the federal
Fugitive Slave Act, Congress could not obligate them to do so because
Congress did not pay their salaries.
Seven of the eight Justices then sitting on the Court agreed
with the outcome of Prigg and with most of Story's opinion and

120. Id. at 141-42.
121. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), and The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518
(1841), were probably more famous when they were decided but were less significant as legal
precedents.
122. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302 ("An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and
persons escaping from the service of their masters.").
123. See generally Finkelman, Story Telling, supra note 41, at 247-94.
124. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625-26 (1842).
125. Id. at 613.
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analysis, although Chief Justice Taney and Justice Peter V. Daniel
strenuously objected to Story's conclusion that the federal government
could not obligate state jurists to enforce the law. 126 All of the majority
Justices agreed with Story that under the Constitution,
the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union, to seize
and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace or any
illegal violence. In this sense, and to this extent this clause of the constitution may
properly be said to execute itself; and to require no aid from legislation, state or
national. 127

McLean stood alone, dissenting from the majority opinion that
overturned Prigg's conviction for kidnapping and concluded that state
personal liberty laws were unconstitutional. 12 He was particularly
unhappy with Story's assertion that the Constitution provided for a
right of self-help for slaveowners trying to recover fugitive slaves. In
his dissent, Justice McLean pointed out the logical problems of
limiting Story's right of self help to instances in which there was no
breach of the peace:
But it is said, the master may seize his slave wherever he finds him, if by doing so, he
does not violate the public peace; that the relation of master and slave is not affected by
the laws of the state, to which the slave may have fled, and where he is found. If the
master has a right to seize and remove the slave, without claim, he can commit no
breach of the peace, by using all the force necessary to accomplish his object. 129

Surely if a master had a right to a slave without a judicial hearing, as
Story claimed, then the amount of violence or force used to exercise
this right should not matter, and this rationale, McLean knew, meant
that the majority opinion would bring the law of slavery into the
North.
The facts of Prigg, which Story mostly ignored and on which
only McLean focused, illustrate the problem of the case and the
importance of McLean's dissent. In 1837, Edward Prigg and three
other men traveled to Pennsylvania, where they seized Margaret
Morgan, her husband, and their children as fugitive slaves and
brought them before local Justice of the Peace Thomas Henderson to
obtain a certificate of removal, as required by the Pennsylvania
Personal Liberty Law of 1826. Morgan's parents had been
emancipated informally sometime around the War of 1812 by their

126. At first glance the position taken by Taney and Daniel-that Congress can force state
officials to enforce the federal law-seems counterintuitive to their strong support for states'
rights. However, Taney consistently supported a proslavery nationalism and was willing to
expand federal power to protect slavery.
127. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 613.
128. Id. at 660-61 (McLean, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 668.
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owner, John Ashmore. Morgan grew up thinking she was free and had
always lived as a free woman in Maryland. Indeed, in 1830, the U.S.
Census for Harford County, Maryland, (taken by the county sheriff)
listed her as a free woman of color along with her husband, who was
born free in Pennsylvania. 3 0 In 1832, the Morgans moved to
Pennsylvania, and no one in Maryland made any attempt to prevent
them from doing so.
In 1837, Ashmore's widow sent her son-in-law and three
neighbors, including Edward Prigg, to retrieve Margaret and her
children. At least one and maybe more of Margaret's children also had
been born Pennsylvania. Given these facts, Justice of the Peace
Henderson concluded that Margaret might actually be free and that
her husband and her Pennsylvania-born children were clearly free.
Thus, he refused to authorize the removal of Margaret and her family.
At this point, Prigg and his cohorts seized Margaret and her children
(but not her Pennsylvania-born husband) in violation of the
Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law, which regulated the return of
fugitive slaves. They took Margaret and her children to Maryland
where Mrs. Ashmore soon sold them "to a negro trader ... for
shipment to the South."'131 Prigg subsequently was convicted of
kidnapping under Pennsylvania's Personal Liberty Law, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the conviction. Prigg then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which overturned his conviction.
Story held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional and
that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue. 132 Thus, the states could implement only the federal law and
could not pass any supplementary laws. That this jurisprudence would
lead to the kidnapping of Margaret Morgan's free-born children--or
even Morgan herself-was of little concern to Justice Story or a
majority of the Court. For McLean, however, the effect of the holding
on Morgan and her family was a significant issue.
McLean dissented from the outcome of the case and from most
of Story's analysis. McLean agreed with Story that the federal
government had exclusive power to regulate the return of fugitive
slaves. 33 But McLean's support for congressional exclusivity was
based on his desire to create some measure of protection and due
130. Finkelman, Story Telling, supra note 41, at 275 (citing U.S. Census, 1830, Manuscript
Census for Hartford County, Maryland 394).
131. THOMAS C. HAMBLY, ARGUMENT OF MR. HAMBLY, OF YORK, (PA.) IN THE CASE OF
EDWARD PRIGG 9 (1842), reprinted in 1 FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS: THE PAMPHLET

LITERATURE 129 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).
132. Prigg,41 U.S. at 617-18.
133. Id. at 665 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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process for free blacks. McLean explained that, under the Fugitive
Slave Act,
[t]he fugitive is presumed to be at large, for the claimant is authorized to seize him.
After seizure, he is in custody .... And the claimant is required to take him1 34before a
judicial officer of the state; and it is before such officer his claim is to be made.

But this nationalist position led McLean to emphatically reject Story's
notion of self-help. He argued against this right as a matter of
constitutional interpretation and legal theory: "Congress have [sic]
legislated on the constitutional power, and have [sic] directed the
mode in which it shall be executed. The act, it is admitted, covers the
whole ground; and that it is constitutional, there seems to be no
reason to doubt.' 13 5 If this were so, could "the provisions of the act be
136
disregarded, and an assumed power set up under the constitution?"'
McLean thought such a concept was "wholly inadmissible by any
137
known rule of construction."'
As a matter of legal theory, McLean clearly had the better
argument. If Congress had exclusive power to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause of the Constitution, and if the 1793 law was
constitutional, then there could be no separate right under the
Constitution by which the claimant could act on his own, in disregard
of the law. Thus, McLean was the only member of the Court willing to
support the Fugitive Slave Act fully and demand that it be applied to
all fugitive slave cases. In other words, McLean wanted full judicial
superintendence of all fugitive slave returns.
Unlike Story and the rest of the Court, McLean did not think
that exclusive federal jurisdiction over fugitive slave rendition
precluded state legislation designed to protect the liberty of free
blacks. He agreed that the states could not pass laws to obstruct the
federal Fugitive Slave Act, 138 but he emphatically rejected Story's
position that allowed a master to "seize and remove" a fugitive "by
force," taking him "out of the state in which he may be found, in
defiance of its laws ... which regulate the police of the state, maintain
the peace of its citizens, and preserve its territory and jurisdiction
from acts of violence.' 1 39 Indeed, McLean argued that this aspect of

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
void.").
139.

Id. at 667.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666 ("[Llaws which are in conflict with the constitution, or the act of 1793... are
Id.
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Story's opinion was an invitation for lawlessness in violation of both
state laws and the demands of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.
Thus, McLean argued for upholding state personal liberty laws
in order to protect both northern and southern institutions. He noted
that in the slave states, "every coloured person is presumed to be a
slave; and on the same principle, in a non-slave-holding state, every
person is presumed to be free, without regard to colour."'140 McLean
believed that the free states could protect their free black citizens and
"prohibit, as Pennsylvania has done, ... the forcible removal of a
coloured person out of the state."'141 McLean argued that these
personal liberty laws did not conflict with the Fugitive Slave Act
because the Act only authorized "a forcible seizure of the slave by the
master, not to take him out of the state, but to take him before some
judicial officer within it," while the Pennsylvania law only "punishe[d]
a forcible removal of a coloured person out of the state.' 1 42 Thus, the
personal liberty laws, if enforced properly, would only interfere with
the illegal removal of free people-such as Morgan's Pennsylvaniaborn children-and would not prevent the return to bondage of an
actual fugitive slave. McLean argued that every state had an
"inherent and sovereign power ... to protect its jurisdiction and the
peace of its citizens, in any and every mode which its discretion shall
43
dictate."1
McLean happily accepted Story's nationalist vision that the
federal government had exclusive power over the return of fugitive
slaves, but at the same time, he argued that the northern states could
protect their free blacks from being kidnapped and could guarantee a
fair procedure for anyone seized as a fugitive slave. Meanwhile, he
was willing to concede that the South could treat all blacks as it
wished and could presume that all blacks in its jurisdiction were
slaves.
Justice Story refused to require state officials to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. In the first use of what today is called the
concept of unfunded mandates, Justice Story said that state officials
could not be required to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act because the
federal government did not pay their salaries. McLean, however,
would have required state officials to enforce the Act, asserting that
"where the constitution imposes a positive duty on a state or its
officers to surrender fugitives, congress may prescribe the mode of
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673.
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proof, and the duty of the State officers."'144 He believed that the issue
of fugitives from both justice and labor was significant enough to
warrant an exception to the general rule that "Congress can no more
regulate the jurisdiction of the state tribunals, than a state can define
the judicial power of the Union. 145 The first two sections of the Act of
1793 had dealt with fugitives from justice, and in that portion of the
law Congress had imposed obligations on state governors that never
had been challenged. McLean believed that Congress could, "on the
same principle, require appropriate duties in regard to the surrender
of fugitives from labour, by other state officers."'146 This was a
compromise McLean was willing to accept: the states would
conscientiously enforce the federal law and return actual fugitive
slaves, but at the same time, the northern states could protect free
blacks from being kidnapped and also give alleged fugitives a chance
to prove their free status in the state where they were seized-close to
the witnesses who could testify on their behalf.
Over the next two decades, the issue of fugitive slaves would be
central to the growing sectional tensions over slavery. After Prigg,
most northern states withdrew any support for the return of fugitive
slaves, 147 leading to the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,
which only exacerbated sectional tensions. McLean offered a different
approach, one that would have recognized the interest that free states
had in protecting their populace from kidnapping, while at the same
time recognizing that Southerners had a constitutional right to
recover fugitive slaves. 48 It is not clear that McLean's compromise
would have worked. Cases like Margaret Morgan's show just how
slippery the definitions were. Morgan claimed she was free because
she had never been treated as a slave while Maryland asserted that as
the daughter of a slave she was still a slave because neither she nor
her parents had ever been formally emancipated. Pennsylvania
claimed that Morgan's children born in that state were free because no
slave could be born in the state, while Maryland claimed that if
Morgan was a fugitive slave living in Pennsylvania, her status and
that of her children was governed by Maryland law. Given the
competing interests of the free states and the slaves states, state laws
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 666.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 665.
Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts:Antislavery Use of a

ProslaveryDecision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 35 (1979).

148. See Prigg,41 U.S. at 670-71 (McLean, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute designed
to "prohibit[] the forcible abduction of persons of color" does not conflict with the Constitution,
but that "the master [is] entitled to his property").
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like Pennsylvania's would have been a thorn in the side of claimants.
Also, there was no guarantee that state officials would have
cooperated with the enforcement of the federal law. 149 Even McLean
conceded that his solution might not have been effective:
This power may be resisted by a state, and there is no means of coercing it. In this view,
the power may be considered an important one. So the supreme court of a State may
refuse to certify its record on a writ of error to the supreme court of the Union, under the
25th section of the judiciary act. But resistance to a constitutional authority by any of
the State functionaries, should not be anticipated; and if15made,
the federal government
0
may rely upon its own agency in giving effect to the laws.

However imperfect, McLean's was perhaps a more viable
solution to the constitutional compromise than Story's solution
because it would have created a reciprocal understanding that would
have benefited both sides. Story's opinion, which gave the North no
opportunity to protect its free blacks and thus forced the North to
refuse to cooperate with the return of fugitives, surely was not the
answer. "McLean offered a solution to the problem that, however
cumbersome, might have reduced tensions over the growing problem
of fugitive slaves. McLean, however, was a lone dissenter on an
151
increasingly proslavery Court."'
Following Prigg, McLean consistently upheld the right of
masters to recover fugitive slaves when the blacks in question were
actually fugitives. In Jones v. Van Zandt152 and Norris v. Newton
(popularly known as the South Bend Fugitive Slave Case), 5 3 McLean
presided over trials in which abolitionists were saddled with huge
financial losses for helping slaves escape from their masters. McLean
may have had some sympathy for these abolitionists, but he could not
54
countenance law breaking.
In Van Zandt, McLean surely must have felt some anguish at
seeing a relatively poor farmer bankrupted. 55 Van Zandt had offered a
149. See id. at 673 ("It appears, in the case under consideration, that the state magistrate
before whom the fugitive was brought refused to act.").
150. Id. at 666.
151. Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra note 98, at 650.
152. 13 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501), aff'd, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
153. 18 F. Cas. 322 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307). For an in-depth discussion of this case
see Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, supra note 105, at 93-195.
154. See Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. at 1045-46 (stating that much had been made in argument
about "the laws of nature, of conscience, and of the rights of conscience," but that, when the laws
indicated to the contrary "[w]e are bound to sustain them").
155. See id. at 1046 (noting that the verdict entered against Van Zandt was twelve hundred
dollars); see also SAMUEL P. CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE: AN ARGUMENT
FOR THE DEFENDANT SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE
DECEMBER TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WHARTON JONES V. JOHN VANZANDT 6 (1847) ("The

defendant John Van Zandt, is an old man, of limited education and slender means ....).
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ride to a group of blacks walking along a road outside of Cincinnati. 156
Slave catchers later overtook Van Zandt's wagon and captured all but
one of the fugitives. 157 Jones successfully sued Van Zandt for the value
of the missing slave plus the cost of recovering the others. 158 McLean
might have used the facts of the case to support Van Zandt on the
ground that he had no notice that the blacks he took on as passengers
were actually fugitives, but McLean probably believed that Van Zandt,
a known abolitionist, 159 was not innocent. Indeed, he almost certainly
knew what he was doing and very well may have been driving his
wagon on that road at that time because it was a prearranged pick up
160
spot for these fugitives.
The situation in Newton probably engendered less sympathy.
The case began when a mob had surrounded Norris and forcibly took
161
his slaves to South Bend, Indiana, where a local judge set them free.
The leaders of the mob included the local sheriff, the leading
stockholders of the Indiana State Bank, and other important citizens
of the community. 162 While he may have approved of their hostility to
bondage, McLean could not condone such lawless behavior.
Cases like Van Zandt and Norris v. Newton only involved
money, and that may have made them easier for McLean to decide
than other cases. Occasionally, as in Miller v. McQuerry,163 McLean
actually had to remand a fugitive slave to an owner. As Robert Cover
demonstrated, McLean was deeply torn by those decisions because he
was personally more opposed to slavery than any other Supreme
164
Court Justice, and probably more than any other federal judge.
In McQuerry, McLean offered a summary of the evidence that
left no doubt that under Kentucky law, Miller owned McQuerry:
From the facts proved, there can be no doubt that the fugitive, under the laws of
Kentucky, is the slave of the claimant, and that he absconded from his service a little
more than four years ago. The testimony is clear on this point. No attempt has been

156. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. at 1040.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1045.
159. See ALBERT B. HART, SLAVERY AND ABOLITION, 1831-1841, at 281-82 (1936) (describing
Van Zandt as "an abolitionist, and official of the Underground Railroad").
160. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF

SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868, at 166 (2006) (asserting that Van Zandt's farm was a known
stop on the Underground Railroad).
161. 18 F. Cas. 322, 322-24 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307).
162. See Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, supra note 105, 99-116 (describing the members of the
mob and later suits lodged against several of them).
163. 17 F. Cas. 335, 341 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9583) ("[U]nder the law, I am bound to
remand him to the custody of his master.").
164. COVER, supra note 27, at 243-49.
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made to controvert the facts, or to impeach the credibility of the witnesses. Of the many
cases my judicial duties have required me to examine, where damages were claimed for
aiding the escape of fugitives from labor, no case has been proved with more distinctness
and fullness than this one. No one capable of comprehending evidence can doubt, that
the fugitive lived with the claimant, as his slave, for many
years, and that he left that
16 5
service, without the leave of his master, several years ago.

After rejecting arguments by McQuerry's lawyers that the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793 was unconstitutional, 16 6 McLean declared, "I am
bound to remand him to the custody of his master, with authority to
167
take him to the state of Kentucky, the place from whence he fled."
This was not simple formalism. McLean heard McQuerry while
riding circuit and had always believed that, as a trial judge, he was
not in a position to make policy. As early as his opinion in Carneal,
McLean had asserted that "[j]udicial functions can but seldom be
exercised in a discussion of policy: this is the peculiar province of the
legislator.... The course of the judge is marked by law; and the
168
construction of which he may only exercise a legal discretion."
However much it must have pained him to return McQuerry to his
master, McLean had no other options as long as he remained on the
bench. As a judge, he had an obligation to obey the laws of the land
and enforce the Constitution.
On the Supreme Court, McLean continued to uphold the
169
Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 in Jones v. Van Zandt,
discussed above, and Ableman v. Booth,170 although he did not write
opinions in these cases. McLean never doubted that the Constitution
required the return of fugitive slaves, and in this sense he agreed with
the proslavery majority on the Court. 171 But, unlike his proslavery
brethren, McLean also believed that the free states had a right to ban
slavery, that the free states had a right to protect free blacks from
being kidnapped, and that the Fugitive Slave Clause had to be applied
narrowly and carefully to balance slavery and freedom.1 72 Finally, he

165. 17 F. Cas. at 336.
166. Id. at 337-40.
167. Id. at 341.
168. Ohio v. Carneal, supra note 110, at 136.
169. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229 (1847), aff'g 13 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501)
(reaffirming the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
170. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
171. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 667 (McLean, J., dissenting)
("Both the constitution and the act of 1793, require the fugitive from labor to be delivered up, on
claim being made [to the person] to whom service is due.").
172. Compare id. at 669-71 (McLean, J., dissenting) (finding within the sovereignty of free
states the right to ban slavery and prevent parties from capturing free black citizens by
instituting a presumption that they were free rather than fugitive), with id. at 637-38 (Baldwin,
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emphatically believed that Congress had the power to ban slavery in
the territories. 173 These views led McLean to support freedom where
he could, both on circuit and on the Supreme Court.
C. The Jurisprudenceof Free Soil
In Carneal, McLean had asserted emphatically the right of
Ohio to free a slave who was not a fugitive slave. 174 While on the
Supreme Court, McLean reiterated the views set out in Carneal in a
number of cases. His first opportunity came while riding circuit in
Spooner v. McConnell.175 Here, McLean affirmed his view that Ohio
was forever to be free from slavery. Spooner had nothing to do with
slavery, but McLean used the case to assert that the Northwest
Ordinance prohibited Ohio from allowing slavery "without the consent
of the original states." 176 This was a particularly strong position
because McLean argued that even if the people of Ohio wanted to
introduce slavery in the state, they could not do so. In McLean's view,
Ohio did not have complete power over its own destiny because it
could not abrogate the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance. But
McLean happily exploited this argument to protect Ohio from slavery
forever:
The institution of slavery existed in many of the original states, at the period of the
adoption of the ordinance of '87; and, in several of them, it-continues to exist. Yet, the
ordinance expressly inhibits the introduction of slavery in any of the states to be formed
within the territory; and these states have made this provision of the ordinance, a part
of their constitution. In this case then, it is clear, that some of the original states possess
rights, and exercise a species of jurisdiction, which is prohibited to Ohio, and other
177
states.

McLean further developed his ideas about free soil in his first
important Supreme Court opinion involving slavery-his dissent in
J., concurring) (contending that authority to legislate on slave issues rested "exclusively in
congress").

173. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 540-47 (1857) (McLean, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting vehemently from the Court's judgment that Congress had no authority to
ban slavery in the territories).
174. Ohio v. Carneal, supra note 110, at 140 ("If a citizen of another state employ his slaves
to labor in this state for his benefit, by such an act, he forfeits the right of property in his
slaves.").
175. 22 F. Cas. 939 (C.C.D. Ohio 1838) (No. 13,245).
176. Id. at 943.
177. Id. at 951. Ironically, one plaintiff in this case, Lysander Spooner, became one of the
most radical abolitionists of the antebellum period. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Who's Afraid of
Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 9 (2006) (describing Spooner as among the
preeminent radical abolitionists of his day). Even though he lost this case, which involved land
he owned in Ohio, Spooner was probably happy to have helped prevent slavery from ever
spreading into the Old Northwest.
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Groves v. Slaughter,178 a virtually forgotten case involving a
commercial transaction. In 1836, Moses Groves, a Mississippi planter,
purchased a large number of slaves from Robert Slaughter of
Louisiana. Groves gave Slaughter a $7,000 promissory note for these
slaves but then refused to honor the note, claiming the sale was void
under the Mississippi Constitution, which prohibited the importation
of slaves "as merchandize, or for sale." 179 The provision was not an
attempt to limit slavery in Mississippi; rather, it was designed to
prevent an outflow of capital from Mississippi to other states.1i 0
Migrants to the state were free to bring slaves with them, and by
implication residents could travel to other states to purchase slaves
and bring them back to Mississippi.18 1 But under the constitutional
provision, traders like Slaughter could not bring unsold slaves into the
state as merchandise or ship slaves into the state to purchasers like
83
Groves.1 8 2 Significantly, Groves did not offer to return the slaves.
Slaughter successfully sued Groves in Louisiana federal court, and
Groves, who was represented by Robert Walker, one of Mississippi's
U.S. senators, appealed to the Supreme Court.1 8 4 Slaughter retained
the services of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.18 5 Beyond the
interests of the immediate parties, more than $3 million was at stake
because of the numerous slaves sold to planters in Mississippi.186
In a straightforward opinion, Justice Smith Thompson ruled
that the Mississippi constitutional provision was not in force until
1837 when Mississippi passed enabling legislation. 8 7 The 1836
contract for the sale of slaves was therefore valid, and Groves was
obligated to pay Slaughter.18 8 In reaching this conclusion, Thompson
avoided the central constitutional question: did Mississippi's ban on
slaves as merchandise violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution?'8 9
Although Thompson avoided the issue, McLean
did not.
Expressing his growing commercial nationalism, McLean endorsed the

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
Id. at 451.
See id. at 463 (stating that the provision was directed at "transient merchants").
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 450-52.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503.
Id.
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idea that Congress could regulate all interstate commerce, noting that
the "necessity of a uniform commercial regulation, more than any
other consideration, led to the adoption of the federal constitution."' 190
Having taken this strong position, however, McLean asserted that
slaves were not "merchandize" under the Commerce Clause, but
"persons," and therefore the states were free to prohibit the
introduction of slaves into their domains.' 91 McLean asserted that
Ohio could not ban the importation "of the cotton of the south, or the
manufactured articles of the north,"' 92 but he defended the right of his
home state to ban slaves: "The power over slavery belongs to the
states respectively. It is local in its character, and in its effects; and
the transfer or sale of slaves cannot be separated from this power. It
is, indeed, an essential part of it."193 Here McLean's antislavery stance
dovetailed with proslavery arguments that the national government
could not touch slavery in the states where it existed. But this
dovetailing was mere coincidence because McLean took this position to
protect the North's right to exclude slaves. He asserted that "[e]ach
state has a right to protect itself against the avarice and intrusion of
the slave dealer; to guard its citizens against the inconveniences and
dangers of a slave population."'1 94 In one of the strongest
condemnations of slavery articulated by an antebellum Supreme
Court Justice, McLean concluded:
The right to exercise this power, by a state, is higher and deeper than the constitution.
The evil involves the prosperity, and may endanger the existence of a state. Its power to
guard against, or to remedy the evil, rests upon the law of self-preservation; a law vital
195
to every community, and especially to a sovereign state.

Slavery was an "evil," and McLean insisted that his state could choose
to have nothing to do with it.196 Implicit in McLean's arguments,
however, was the notion that Congress might have the power to
regulate, or even ban, the interstate slave trade.
A year after Groves, McLean wrote his important dissent in
Prigg. He continued to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act, 97 as he said he
must do in his Prigg opinion, 198 but he also continued to try to protect

190. Id. at 504 (McLean, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 506-07.
192. Id. at 507.
193. Id. at 508.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. E.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045-46 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501).
198. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 669 (McLean, J., dissenting) ("The act, it is
admitted.., is constitutional, there seems no reason to doubt.").
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the concept of freedom in the North. The tension between free soil and
the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution intersected in 1845 in
Vaughn v. Williams.199 In that case McLean, riding circuit, found for
Williams, an abolitionist who had helped some fugitive slaves
escape. 20 0 At first glance, the facts of the case seemed clear and
unfavorable to Williams. Vaughn's three slaves had escaped to
Indiana. 20 1 He found them, but was soon surrounded by white friends
of the fugitives, who were led by Williams. 20 2 The slaves escaped, and
Vaughn sued Williams for the value of the slaves.20 3 Although he
never liked enforcing civil judgments against abolitionists like
Williams, McLean usually charged juries to find in favor of the
slaveowner because the Constitution and the Fugitive Slave Acts
protected the owner's right to recover his slaves. 20 4 But this case
included another set of facts.
Williams proved that, before Vaughn had purchased these
slaves, they had been owned by a Kentuckian named Tipton. 20 5 In
1835, Tipton took the slaves to Illinois, a free state, where he kept
them for about six months. 20 6 Tipton then took the slaves to Missouri
and sold them. 20 7 Tipton returned to Illinois where he lived for at least
two years and voted as an Illinois resident. 20 8 This evidence was
enough for McLean to declare that the three blacks had become free
because they had lived in Illinois. 20 9 Had Tipton merely been passing
through Illinois, the slaves might not have gained their freedom. But
he had lived there with his slaves for six months and had clearly
211
become a resident of the state. 21 0 This was enough to free the slaves,

199. 28 F. Cas. 1115 (C.C.D. Ind. 1845) (No. 16,903).
200. Id. at 1118.
201. Id. at 1116-17.
202. Id. at 1117.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 326-27 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850) (No. 10,307)
(stating in the jury charge that the defendant "cannot claim a right to do that which the law
forbids"); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cas. 325, 329 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 11,590) ("We must stand
firmly by the principles of the constitution, and maintain the rights secured by it... free from all
influences which do not arise from the facts and law of the case."); Giltner v. Gorham, 10 F. Cas.
424, 432 (C.C.D. Mich. 1848) (No. 5433) ("The defendants' counsel ... have discussed the
abstract principle of slavery. It is not the province of this court, or of this jury, to deal with
abstractions of any kind."); Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1046 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No.
7501) ("It is your duty to follow the law ... .
205. Vaughn, 28 F. Cas. at 1116.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1116-17.
208. Id. at 1117.
209. Id. at 1118.
210. Id.
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which meant that Vaughn had no property interest in them and could
not claim them under the Fugitive Slave Act. 212 Nor could he sue
Williams for rescuing them from what was, in fact, his unlawful
2 13
custody.
In Strader v. Graham, McLean continued to develop a
jurisprudence of freedom for the North, in contrast to the Court's
jurisprudence of slavery. McLean was especially intent on protecting
the right of Ohio and the states carved out of the old Northwest to
remain untainted by slavery, except where absolutely required to by
the Constitution. 214 Like Groves v. Slaughter, Strader did not directly
involve any slaves or abolitionists. 21 5 Graham was the owner of three
slaves who had boarded Strader's steamboat, escaped to Ohio, and
then moved to Canada. 21 6 Graham successfully sued Strader for the
value of the slaves under a Kentucky law that made steamboat owners
liable for the loss of slaves who escaped on their ships. 217 Strader
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that the slaves
actually had become free because Graham previously had given them
permission to go to Indiana and Ohio, where they performed as
musicians. 2 18 Under McLean's decision in Vaughn v. Williams, these
slaves would have had a strong claim to freedom if they had been
captured while running to Canada. Had their status come before
McLean while on circuit, he might very well have ruled that allowing
the slaves to earn money in Indiana was de facto emancipation.
But, in Strader the status of the slaves was not before the
Supreme Court. 21 9 Strader argued that, under the Northwest
Ordinance, the slaves had become free and Kentucky was bound to
follow that Ordinance because it was a federal law. 220 Speaking for a
unanimous Court, however, Chief Justice Taney held that whether
Graham's slaves were free could only be determined by Kentucky law
because that was where the case originated. Taney declared:
Every State has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social
condition, of the persons domiciled within its territory; except in so far as the powers of

211.
212.
evidence
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
See id. ("As the claim to the services of these persons is not sustained, if you believe the
...you will find for the defendant.").
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 41, at 248-51.
51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 97 (1850) (McLean, J., concurring).
Id. at 92-93.
Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 94.
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the States in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them,
by the Constitution of the United States. There is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States that can in any degree control the law of Kentucky upon this subject. And
the condition of the negroes, therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return,
depended altogether upon the laws of that State, and could not be influenced by the
laws of Ohio. It was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to determine for itself whether
their employment in another State should or should not make them free on their return.
The [Kentucky] Court of Appeals have determined, that by the laws of the State they
continued to be slaves. And their judgment upon this point is, 1upon this writ of error,
22
conclusive upon this court, and we have no jurisdiction over it.

Taney rejected on two grounds Strader's claim that the slavery
provision of the Northwest Ordinance had freed these slaves. First,
Taney argued that the Ordinance could have no effect beyond its own
jurisdiction, and the Ordinance "certainly could not restrict the power
of the States within their respective territories; nor in any manner
interfere with their laws and institutions; nor give this court any
control over them. '222 Thus, the Ordinance, in Taney's mind, was like
a state law rather than a national law and could not have any legal
effect south of the Ohio River. Taney asserted that the Ordinance
"could have no more operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of
Kentucky, and could not influence the decision upon the rights of the
master or the slaves in that State, nor give this court jurisdiction upon
the subject. ' 223 Morover, in his second point, Taney determined that
the Northwest Ordinance was no longer in force anyway, and thus it
was not binding on the nation or any of the states. 224
McLean agreed that the court lacked jurisdiction in Strader
and that the outcome was therefore correct. 225 He presumably agreed
with Taney that the states generally had the power to determine the
status of people within their jurisdiction because this conclusion
dovetailed with his opinion in Vaughn v. Williams. As if to reiterate
this point, McLean reminded his brethren that slavery was banned
under the Ohio Constitution, and "all questions of freedom must arise
under the constitution, and not under the Ordinance. '226 However, at
the same time, he chided Taney for his comments on the status of the
Ordinance, noting that since Kentucky was not bound to follow the
Ohio Constitution, and the Court therefore had no jurisdiction in the
case, "any thing that is said in the opinion of the court, in relation to

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 93-94 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 97 (McLean, J., concurring).
Id.
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the Ordinance, beyond this, is not in the case, and is, consequently,
227
extrajudicial."
Under Strader, the northern states presumably could liberate
any slave within their jurisdiction except a fugitive slave, and the
slave states could determine that any black person, even a citizen of a
free state, could be held as a slave. Such a tradeoff made sense to
McLean because he doubtless assumed that few free blacks would
actually go into the South and that most southern states would not
take the extreme position of enslaving free people. 228 At the same
time, Strader allowed McLean to reiterate that his state was a free
state and that the Constitution of Ohio would protect the liberty of all
229
people within its jurisdiction.
D. Dred Scott: McLean's Forgotten Dissent
Six years after Strader, the Supreme Court decided its most
important slavery-related case and arguably its most important case
since McCulloch v. Maryland.230 The literature on Dred Scott v.
Sandford2 31 is voluminous, and the case has been analyzed and
232
reanalyzed for a century and a half.

227. Id. McLean would of course make similar arguments in Dred Scott, noting that once
Taney found he lacked jurisdiction in that case, he could not then pass judgment on the validity
of the Missouri Compromise. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 589 (1857) (Curtis,
J., dissenting). Justice McLean made a similar point in his dissent. Numerous Republican
leaders, especially Abraham Lincoln, would make the same comments about Taney's opinion in
Dred Scott. E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism'sForgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 37, 60 & n.95 (1993).
228. Since the 1820s South Carolina had laws in place allowing for the enslavement of free
blacks who moved there. Paul Finkelman, States' Rights North and South in Antebellum
America, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
125, 130-32 (Kermit Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1989). On the eve of the Civil War, Arkansas
would pass a law requiring free blacks to leave the state or be enslaved. An Act to Remove the
Free Negroes Mulattoes from this State, Act of Feb. 12, 1859, No. 151, 1859 Ark. Acts 175-78.
229. Strader, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 97 (McLean, J., concurring).
230. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
231. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
232. Most importantly, see AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837-1857 (2006); THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND LAW (David Konig et al. eds., forthcoming
2010); WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS (1979); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED
SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1997); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandfor& The
Court's Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2007)
[hereinafter Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case]; Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott
Correctly Decided?An "ExpertReport" For the Defendant, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219 (2008).
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The general outline of the case is well known. Scott was born a
slave in Virginia, taken to Missouri when he was between twenty-five
233
and thirty, and sold to Dr. John Emerson, a U.S. Army surgeon.
Emerson took Scott to Fort Armstrong in Illinois and then to Fort
Snelling in what was then the Wisconsin Territory (and is today
Minnesota). 23 4 Illinois was a free jurisdiction under the Northwest
Ordinance and the Illinois Constitution of 1819.235 Both the Missouri
Compromise of 1820236 and the Wisconsin Enabling Act 23 7 prohibited
slavery in the Wisconsin Territory. While at Fort Snelling, Scott
married another slave, Harriet Robinson, and eventually they had two
children. 238 After his master died, Scott tried to buy his freedom, but
Emerson's widow, Irene Sanford Emerson, refused to allow him to do
this. 23 9 Scott then sued for his freedom, arguing that he had become
240 Since 1824,241
free through his residence in two free jurisdictions.
the Missouri courts had held that slaves who were taken to free
jurisdictions and held there for a long time, or allowed to work there
even for a short time, were free. 242 This was precisely the issue that
McLean had addressed in Vaughn v. Williams. 243 Following a long line
of Missouri precedents, a St. Louis jury declared Scott free in 1850.244
However, in 1852, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed this result,
explicitly declaring that it would no longer follow the old
precedents. 245 Such a result was perfectly legitimate under Strader v.
Graham because, as the Court had held there, each state was free to

233. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 13-14.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 14-15.
236. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (Missouri Enabling Act), invalidated by
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
237. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 10, 16 (establishing the territorial government
of Wisconsin). This law went into effect on July 23, 1836. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful
Case, supra note 232, at 15 n.6.
238. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 530 (McLean, J., dissenting).
239. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 19-20.
240. Id. at 13-14.
241. Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824).
242. Id. For a full history of this case see FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 41,
at 217-28 (describing Winny and its progeny in the Missouri courts and their effect on Dred
Scott).
243. See supra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
244. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supranote 232, at 22-23.
245. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 577-81 (1852), affd in part, reversed in part sub nom.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (rejecting a long line of precedent to find
that Scott had returned to a condition of slavery after returning to the state, even if entry into
free states had made him free there).
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decide the status of all the blacks within its jurisdiction. 246 At this
point, the case should have been over.
However, an odd twist of fate gave Dred Scott a new chance for
freedom. By 1852, Mrs. Emerson had moved to Massachusetts and
married Dr. Calvin Chaffee, who was distinctly antislavery. 247 Chaffee
would later become a Republican congressman who would denounce
slavery in the House of Representatives. 4s As the wife of an
antislavery Massachusetts physician, Irene Sanford Emerson Chaffee
transferred ownership of Dred Scott to her brother, John F. A.
Sanford, a New York businessman with professional and personal ties
to St. Louis. 24 9 As long as Sanford kept Scott in Missouri, he could
continue to own him, even though he was legally a citizen of New
York. 250 Scott's newest lawyer, Roswell Field, a native of Vermont,
took advantage of these new circumstances to sue Sanford for false
imprisonment and assault and battery under federal diversity
jurisdiction. 251 Sanford responded with a plea in abatement, arguing
that Scott never could sue in diversity because he was black and no
black person ever could be a citizen of Missouri. 252 Sanford also argued
that Scott was his slave, and thus, he was legally entitled to confine
him or chastise him. 253 Scott replied that he had become free by living
in Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory, and if he were free and living
in Missouri, he must be a citizen for purposes of diversity
254
jurisdiction.
U.S. District Judge Robert Wells ultimately ruled that Scott
could sue in diversity because if he were free, then he should be able
to sue in federal court. 255 But, after hearing the case, Wells ruled on
the merits that Scott was still a slave because the federal courts were
obligated to follow the common law of the state where the case was
filed. 256 Scott then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Because he

246. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93-94 (1850).
247. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 23-24.
248. Id. at 23-24, 38.
249. Id. at 23-24. John Sanford spelled his name with only one "d." However, the clerk of the
Supreme Court added a "d" to his name, and thus the case is forever known and cited as Dred
Scott v. Sandford.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 24-25. See generally KENNETH C. KAUFMAN,
BIOGRAPHY OF ROSWELL M. FIELD (1996).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

DRED SCOTT's ADVOCATE: A

Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 25-26.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 471 (1857) (Daniel, J., concurring).
Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 13, 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
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won the case, Sanford did not appeal the judge's adverse ruling on his
257
plea in abatement.
The case was first argued in the December 1855 Term, but in
the spring of 1856, the Court declined to decide the case and instead
held it over until the following Term. 258 The Court heard arguments in
December 1856, which was after the presidential election of 1856.259
The Court then announced its decision two days after President
Buchanan was inaugurated. 260 In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld
Judge Wells's ruling.2 6 1 The outcome of the case, however, is not what
made it famous. The Court might easily have affirmed the lower court
under Strader v. Graham. Or the Court might have declared that it
lacked jurisdiction on the ground that free blacks were not citizens of
Missouri, and thus Scott, even if free, had no standing to sue in
federal court.
Instead, in a sweeping and shocking decision, Chief Justice
Taney held that: (1) blacks never could be citizens of the United
States, even if they were full citizens in the states in which they lived,
and thus could never sue in diversity; 26 2 (2) Congress could not pass
laws to regulate the territories; 263 and (3) the ban on slavery in the
Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because slaveowners had
a constitutional right to take their property into any federal territory,
and thus any law emancipating slaves within the jurisdiction of
Congress would constitute a taking of private property without due
264
process of law.
Justices McLean and Benjamin Robbins Curtis dissented with
detailed responses to Taney's opinion. The Curtis dissent was
reprinted and distributed throughout the North during the election
campaigns from 1857 until the presidential election of 1860.265 Curtis
was not known to be antislavery; indeed, he was considered to be a
proslavery doughface. 266 His political ties were to the conservative
Boston merchants, known as "Cotton Whigs," who were deeply
257. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 530-31 (McLean, J., dissenting).
258. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 28-29.
259. Id. at 28.
260. Id. at 46.
261. Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (1996).
262. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 422-23.
263. Id. at 449-52.
264. Id. at 452-54.
265. E.g., Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 45 (describing
newspaperman and Republican Horace Greeley's reprinting of the Curtis dissent in pamphlet
form to stoke antislavery political spirit).
266. Id. at 30-31 (referring to Curtis as "not even moderately antislavery").
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interested in a steady source of cotton for their factories and utterly
unconcerned about the nature of the labor that produced the cotton. 267
Thus, Curtis's vigorous assault on Taney's opinion was a welcome
surprise to Republicans and other opponents of slavery. Curtis's
seventy page dissent overshadowed McLean's shorter opinion.
McLean, however, made a number of points that Curtis did not.
Relying on his nearly thirty years on the bench-he was by this time
the most senior Justice on the Court 2 6S-McLean noted that no one
had appealed the plea in abatement, and thus it was "rather a sharp
practice, and one which seldom, if ever, occurs" for the court to raise
the jurisdictional issue on its own. 26 9 This was especially so since "[n]o
case was cited in the argument as authority, and not a single case
precisely in [sic] point is recollected in our reports," and "[t]he
pleadings do not show a want of jurisdiction." 270 McLean also argued
that even if the jurisdictional issue were before the Court, the outcome
was not correct. He noted that citizenship for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction had never been tied to voting-after all, women could sue
in federal court, as could "any individual who ha[d] a permanent
domicil [sic] in the State under whose laws his rights [were] protected,
and to which he owe[d] allegiance." 271 Surely Scott owed allegiance to
Missouri, and if free, he was enough of a citizen in McLean's mind to
272
sue in federal court.
McLean also directly confronted the deeply racist elements of
Taney's opinion. Taney had gone to great lengths to show that blacks
27 3
were not acceptable as citizens at the time of the nation's founding.
But, McLean responded that "the argument... that a colored citizen
would not be an agreeable member of society" was "more a matter of
taste than of law." 274 He noted that blacks had different rights in
different states-for example, they could vote in some states and not

267. Id. (describing Curtis as a Cotton Whig); Edward M. Maltz, The Last Angry Man:
Benjamin Robbins Curtis & the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 265-269 (2007)
(relating Curtis's personal and political history of "dispassionate" views on issues of slavery and
identification as a Cotton Whig).
268. E.g., G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth
Century, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (2006).
269. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 530-31 (McLean, J., dissenting).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 407-418 (outlining a lengthy historical survey of laws at the time of the founding
as evidence of the "inferior and subject condition of that race" and, by implication, their lack of
citizenship).
274. Id. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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in others. 2 75 In Ohio, they could not vote, but they had many other
rights and could even hold office. 276 McLean also noted the hypocrisy
of using race as a proxy for citizenship:
On the question of citizenship, it must be admitted that we have not been very
fastidious. Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have made citizens of all grades,
combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of Louisiana and Florida.
No one ever doubted, and no court ever held, that the people of these Territories did not
become citizens under the treaty. They have exercised all the rights of citizens, without
277
being naturalized under the acts of Congress.

Citing numerous cases and various historical examples,
McLean asserted that Congress had the power to pass laws for the
territories. 278 He noted that while the Constitutional Convention was
in session, the Congress under the Articles of Confederation passed
the Northwest Ordinance. 279 Thus, the Founders knew perfectly well
that Congress had passed laws for the territories and had specifically
banned slavery in them. "The members of the Convention must
therefore have been well acquainted with the provisions of the
Ordinance. '280 McLean asked, "Can any one suppose that the eminent
men of the Federal Convention could have overlooked or neglected a
matter so vitally important to the country, in the organization of
temporary Governments for the vast territory northwest of the river
Ohio? ' 28 1 Clearly the Framers intended to give Congress the power to
regulate the territories, pass laws for the territories, and even ban
slavery from the territories. 28 2 To conclude otherwise, as Taney did,
was to ignore not only the history of the founding but also the
intelligence of the Founders. Implicitly attacking Taney for betraying
the Founders, McLean declared, "I prefer the lights of Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay, as a means of construing the Constitution ....,,283
If Congress had the power to regulate the territories as
McLean argued, then the Missouri Compromise was valid and Scott
was free. 28 4 McLean also argued that Missouri had an obligation to

275. Id.
276. Paul Finkelman, Race, Slavery, and the Law in Antebellum Ohio, in 2 THE HISTORY OF
OHIO LAw 748 (Michael Les Benedict & John F. Winkler eds., 2004); Paul Finkelman, The
Strange Careerof Race Discriminationin Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 373 (2004).
277. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 538-47.
279. Id. at 539.
280. Id. at 539-40.
281. Id. at 540.
282. See id. at 540-47 ("If Congress may establish a Territorial Government in the exercise
of its discretion, it is a clear principle that a court cannot control that discretion.").
283. Id. at 537.
284. Id. at 554-55.

564

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:2:519

uphold that freedom. 28 5 McLean pointed out that juries in his circuit
regularly punished those who interfered with the return of fugitive
slaves. Indeed, he declared, "I have never found a jury in the four
States which constitute my circuit, which have not sustained" the
Fugitive Slave Act "where the evidence required them to sustain it."286
The juries in his circuit had acted this way "to vindicate the sovereign
rights of the Southern States, and protect the legal interests of our
brethren of the South." 28 7 Missouri thus was obligated to respect the
law of Illinois, which made Dred Scott free. 288 Otherwise, there could
be no comity within the Union.
McLean's opinion was a powerful statement of northern rights.
He implicitly accused Missouri and, by extension Chief Justice Taney,
of undermining harmony within the Union. While Southerners might
rail against the North for failing to support the fugitive slave laws,
McLean showed that, in fact, the North did support those laws.
McLean's antislavery relative Salmon P. Chase had castigated the
Justice for his opinion in Jones v. Van Zandt,2 9 but now McLean's
fidelity to law favored freedom. If McLean and the juries in Ohio were
willing to support the interests of the South, then Missouri, Chief
Justice Taney, and the other Southerners on the Court should be
willing to support the northern state laws that would make Scott a
free man. Of course, the five Southerners on the Court, along with
their doughface allies Robert Grier and Samuel Nelson, ignored
McLean.
IV. CONCLUSION

Most Northerners also ignored McLean's Dred Scott opinion. In
part, they were no doubt enamored with the surprisingly powerful
antislavery opinion from Curtis. However, politics also may have been
a factor. Dred Scott was decided four months after the 1856
presidential election, in which McLean had been a very serious
candidate for the Republican nomination. 290 Had Dred Scott been

285. See id. at 557-62 (contending that such a rule of law was necessary to maintain comity
between the states).
286. Id. at 558.
287. Id. at 559.
288. Id.
289. See COVER, supra note 27, at 247 (quoting Chase as stating he believed that McLean, in
rendering the Van Zandt decision, "fell into great error"); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for
Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 500 (2004) (quoting Chase that if McLean's Van Zandt opinion

stood, the "Declaration of Independence [is] a fable").
290. Finkelman, The Court's Most Dreadful Case, supra note 232, at 30 n.98.
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decided in the spring of 1856, McLean's dissent might have thrust him
into the Republican nomination and perhaps even the White House.
While not as charismatic as Fr6mont, he might have carried some of
the conservative northern states as a symbol of gravitas and as a
throwback to the golden age of Monroe and Adams.
By the spring of 1857, Republicans were looking at the next
election. The party had done well in 1856 with a famous candidate
with little political experience and thought it might win with someone
like Seward or Chase at the head of the ticket in 1860. Puffing
McLean's Dred Scott opinion would have helped no one else in the
party. Thus, party leaders-like Seward; Chase; and the rising
newcomer, Lincoln-generally ignored McLean's solid and powerful
response to Taney's majority opinion. So too did Horace Greeley, who,
between 1857 and 1860, published three pamphlet editions of the
Taney and Curtis opinions to help boost the Republicans 291 but never
gave the public easy access to McLean's opinion.
Thus, even in the wake of his most important dissent, McLean
was underappreciated. In the end, his political ambitions were not
fulfilled, but his lifelong flirtation with the presidency undermined his
reputation and influence as a jurist. 292 In 1861, on the eve the Civil
War, he died, no longer relevant as a political figure and no longer
able to mount a significant challenge to the proslavery, anti-national
jurisprudence of Chief Justice Taney. The best his eulogizer could say
was that McLean was taken away "to prepare us for the evil" that was
coming. 29 3 He was a "great Statesman and Judge,"294 but in the end,
he was not much appreciated.
He deserves better. His lifelong battle against the
nationalization of slavery by the Court was often futile, but he
remained a voice for freedom, however lonely, on a Court dominated
by judges who never knew the meaning of their own title-Justicewhen it came to slavery and race. To his great credit, McLean knew
the meaning of this term and tried, within the limits of his office and
the Constitution, to implement justice for all Americans, even those
who might be called slaves in some states. For that, he should be
better appreciated.

291. FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 38, at 50.
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the negative reactions even of supporters to McLean's extrajudicial statements during his
"perennial" political candidacy).
293. SPRAGUE, supra note 3, at 33.
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